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Article 5

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HOLMES'S
THEORY OF CONTRACT
Patrickj Kelley*
DEDICATION

A scholar, like everyone else, needs heroes-those whose lives
show the possibilities and the glory of a life devoted to discovering and
reporting the truth about important things.
One of my scholar-heroes is John Finnis. I first read his Natural
Law and NaturalRights' in 1982. That brilliant synthesis of the natural
law tradition with the positivism of H.L.A. Hart was an inspiring exam-

ple of methodical, painstaking, and scrupulously honest scholarship.
Moreover, his reformulation of a natural law social science methodol2
ogy provided a fruitful methodology to use in my own legal theory. I
first metJohn Finnis on a visit to Notre Dame in 1984. Since then, he
has generously supported, encouraged, and, at times, edited my work.
I am deeply grateful for his inspiring example, his foundational
thought, and his friendly help.
It is an honor for me to dedicate this Article, heavily influenced
by his work,3 to my friend John Finnis.

* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. I appreciate the
helpful comments of R.J. Robertson, Jr., and Maria Frankowska. This work carries
fonvard a continuing study of the thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The
summary of Holmes's early readings in positivist thought in Part IA is taken from
Patrick J. Kelley, A CriticalAnalysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 681,
697-700 (1983) (reprinted with permission). The summary of Holmes's positivist
goals in The Common Law, infra note 6, in Part I.B is taken from PatrickJ. Kelley, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Utilitarianism,and the Positivism ofJohn Stuart Mill, 30 AM. J. Jtnus. 189,
204-11 (1985) (reprinted with permission).
1 JoHN FINms, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
2 See, e.g., PatrickJ. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart
of Tort Liability, 38 GLEv. ST. L. R v. 315 (1991).
3 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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INTRODUCTION

By the time Oliver Wendell Holmes started to prepare his lectures on contract for his Common Law lecture series, he had accomplished a great portion of the task he had set for himself, which was to
present a general view of the common law. Putting together and reworking his previously published articles, Holmes had elaborated a
theory of the ultimate ground of judicial decision and the consequences of that decision for the community. He had also elaborated a
general theory that law evolved from purely subjective liability standards through more and more objective standards to purely objective
standards. He had applied these two theories in developing a unified
theory of tort and criminal liability, reworking his prior articles on tort
liability and adding a new treatment of criminal law. To round out
the lectures, Holmes had reworked his later, highly philosophical articles on possession and his earlier, more technical articles on
succession.
There remained a big hole in Holmes's attempted general coverage of the common law: the law of contract. Holmes had not published any original articles on contract, so there was no body of work
already done to revise and rework. 4 And Holmes was running out of
time. The lectures were scheduled for the late fall of 1880. He did
5
not start writing his contract lectures until the summer of 1880.
4 Contract law was not, however, terra incognita for Holmes. In the course of
preparing his edition of Kent's Commentaries,he updated the footnotes to Kent's treatment of contracts. See 2JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 607-763 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873). In addition,
Holmes had reviewed both the first and second editions of Langdell's casebook on
contracts, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,adding a brief review of William
Anson's treatise on contracts, Principles of the English Law of Contract, to his review of
Langdell's second edition. See Book Notices, 5 AM. L. REV. 534, 539-40 (1871) (reviewing 1 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 1st ed. 1871)); Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 340, 353-54 (1872)
(reviewing 2 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1st ed. 1871)); Book Notices, 14 AM. L. RErv. 233, 233-35
(1880) (reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1879), and discussing WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879)); see also
Harry C. Shriver, Prefaceto JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES AND
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS at vii (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936) (1871-72)
[hereinafter JuSTICE HOLMES] (noting that Holmes wrote these unsigned Book Notices); Harry C. Shriver, A Bibliography of Selected Articles and Books Relating toJustice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, inJusTcE HOLMES, supra, at 253 (same).
5 See MARK DEWOLFE HoWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING
YEARS, 1870-1872, at 223 (1963).
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Triumphing over these intense deadline pressures, Holmes elaborated a coherent theory of contract consistent with his previously developed theories. In order to appreciate fully that achievement, we
need to understand fully Holmes's theory of contract. But Holmes
gave his three lectures on contract well over a century ago. If we are
to understand fully the theory set forth in those lectures, we must recover their historical context. Besides the ordinary reason for reading
any serious thinker in historical context, there are additional reasons
for reading Holmes that way. Holmes carefully avoided identifying
any influences on his thought, and his writing is aphoristic and complex. Therefore, often, his meaning is elusive.
The relevant historical context for any theorist includes at least
two elements: what he brings to the table-his philosophical and
methodological commitments and his overarching theoretical
agenda-and who is already at the table-the contemporary theorists
whose works present obstacles or provide aid. In Part I, we will explore what Holmes brought to the table. We will examine the positivism of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte that Holmes seemed to
adopt as his philosophical and methodological base. Also, we will explore Holmes's overarching theoretical agenda by analyzing the first
6
four lectures of The Common Law.

In Part II, we will look at who was already at the table. We will
examine Henry Sumner Maine's influential theory that contract law
evolved from primitive formal contracts to modem informal or consensual contracts. We will examine Frederick Pollock's solid, careful
treatise, Principles of Contract,7 published in 1876, which related in a
systematic way the prevailing will theory of contract to the current English law. We will examine Christopher Columbus Langdell's brilliant
but quirky A Summary of the Law of Contracts,8 published in 1880. Finally, focusing on what Holmes brought to the table and on those
already at the table, we will define more precisely the challenges facing Holmes as he drafted his lectures on contract.
In Part IlI, we will place Holmes's three contract lectures in their
relevant historical context and use that context to explore the positiv6 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
7 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQunY
(London, Stevens 1st ed. 1876).
8 C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACrS (Boston, Little, Brown,
& Co. 2d ed. 1880) [hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY]. A Summary of the Law of Contracts was first published as a supplement to the second edition of C.C. LANGDELL, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed.
1879) [hereinafter LANGDETLL, SELECTION OF CASES].
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ist character of Holmes's contract theory. In Part IV, we will assess the
strengths and weaknesses of that theory.
I.

THE CONTEXT OF HoLmEs's CONTRACT LEcruREs: HoLMEs's
PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS AND AGENDA

A.

The Positivism of Mill and Comte

In interpreting and evaluating a theorist's work, it is helpful to
know what philosophical tradition he is working in, for that context
helps us identify the probable goals he seeks to achieve, the things he
may assume, and the possible specialized meanings of terms he may
use.

What philosophical tradition was Holmes working in? Holmes
himself doesn't say; neither in The Common Law nor in any of his other
articles or speeches does Holmes admit an allegiance to any particular
school or tradition. 9 He scrupulously followed the advice he gave to
others not to attach a "fighting tag"1 0 to one's work.
9 Holmes came close to doing so only twice: First, in his article on primitive
notions in modem law, he cited Edward Burnett Tylor's work PrimitiveCulture in such
a way and with such praise as to indicate that Tylor strongly influenced his own analysis. See O.W.H.,Jr., PrimitiveNotions in Modern Law, 10 AM. L. REV. 422, 428-30 (1876)
[hereinafter O.W.H., Primitive Notions] (citing EDWARD BuRNETr TYLOR, PRIMITIVE
CuLTuRE 285 (New York, H. Holt 1st Am. ed. 1874)), reprinted in FREDERICK ROGERS
KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OFJusTICE HOLMES 129, 135-37 (1984). In reworking this essay into his first lecture in The Common Law, Holmes characteristically deleted this fulsome praise of Tylor, with its implication of influence. See HOLMES, supra
note 6, at 5-33.
Second, in his second article on primitive notions in modern law, Holmes explicitly characterized the progression in thought he had sketched in his first Primitive
Notions article, in the terminology of Comte:
In an earlier article, the frame of mind with which we have to deal was shown
in its theological stage, to borrow Comte's well-known phraseology, as when
an axe was made the object of criminal process; and also in the metaphysical,
where the language of personification alone survived, but survived to cause
confusion in reasoning.
O.W. Holmes, Jr., Primitive Notions in Modern Law No. II, 11 AM. L. REv. 641, 654
(1877) [hereinafter Holmes, PrimitiveNotions II] (footnote omitted), reprinted in THE
FORMAIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTIcE HOLMES, supra, at 147, 160. Again, this explicit reference to Comte was deleted in The Common Law version of this article. See HOLMES,
supra note 6, at 265-317.
10 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 21 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1953). In his letter to Harold
Laski dated September 15, 1916, Holmes criticized Laski's article, The Political Theory
of Disruption, 10 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 437 (1916), reprinted in HAROLD LAS~i, THE PRoBLEM OF SoVEREiGNT 27 (1917), in part as follows:
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We do, however, have one invaluable aid in placing Holmes in
the appropriate philosophical context. From 1865 until his death in
1935, Holmes kept a list of books he had read, by year and sometimes
by month. These book lists survived, and the list for the period from
1865 through 1880 has been published.' We have the opportunity,
then, to read Holmes's work against the background of the books he
himself had read. 12 By comparing Holmes's writing with Holmes's
reading, we may be able to trace more precisely the specific influences
on Holmes's thought.
Holmes was a prodigious reader; the search for specific influences in the mass of books on his reading list seems a daunting task.
Fortunately, three separate indicators suggest that the works of Mill
on Holmes's reading list were particularly important to his intellectual
development. First, Holmes's sympathetic and knowledgeable biographer, Mark DeWolfe Howe, singled out the period from 1865 to 1867
as critically important for Holmes's intellectual development and emphasized the strong influence of Mill's work on Holmes in that period.' 3 Second, significant events in Holmes's life point in this
direction as well. In the summer of 1866, Holmes traveled to England
where he met Mill himself.14 Howe characterizes this trip as "the pilgrimage of a maturing mind which had already found its tendenI should drop pragmatic and pluralistic. Perhaps I am the more ready to say
so because after honest attention I don't think there is much in either of
those parts of W. James's philosophy. But in any event, though Pound also
talks of pragmatism, the judging of law by its effects and results did not have
to wait for W.J. or Pound for its existence, and to my mind it rather diminishes the effect, or checks the assent you seek from a reader, if you unneces-

sarily put a fighting tag on your thought.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski, supra, at 20-21 (footnote
omitted).

11 See Eleanor N. Little, The Early Reading ofJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 8 HARv.
LmR.BuLL. 163 (1954).
12 We even have Holmes's own notes on some of his reading. Holmes kept detailed notes on some of the books he read from before 1876 through 1897 in a bound
folio-sized volume. This "Black Book," as it is called, is at the Harvard Law School

Library, together with a number of facsimile copies. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Black Book of Oliver Wendell Holmes (1876-97) (unpublished collection on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
13 See MARK DEWoLxE HowE, JusTIcE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs: THE SHAPING
YEARS, 1841-1870, at 210, 212-17 (1957). Howe'sjudgment deserves respect; he was
Holmes's secretary for a time, edited volumes of Holmes's letters, and immersed himself in Holmes's life and thought before publishing the first two volumes of a projected multi-volume biography.
14 See id.at 223-44.
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cies." 15 Third, the number and weight of Mill's books on Holmes's
reading list suggest their importance: from 1865 to 1867, Holmes read
seven works by Mill, including his two formidable technical works in
philosophy, A System of Logic and An Examination of Sir William Hamil16
ton's Philosophy.
The works of Mill that Holmes read all reflect Mill's commitment
to certain basic tenets of Comte's positivism. 17 Mill made clear the
extent of his agreement with Comte in his 1865 essay, Auguste Comte
and Positivism,18 which Holmes read in 1865 or 1866.19 Mill explicitly
approved Comte's evolutionary theory of the three stages of human
thought and Comte's views on the limitations on human knowledge.
A brief review of those basic Comtean positions, as explained by Mill,
may thus be helpful.
Comte claimed to have discovered an invariable law of three successive stages in the evolution of human thought about phenomena.
In the theological mode of thought, phenomena are attributed to the
wills of living beings, either natural or supernatural. In the metaphysical mode of thought, phenomena are explained by abstract metaphysical entities, such as the "natures" and "efficient causes" of things. 20 In
the final, positive mode of thought, the futile search for the essential
nature and ultimate causes of events is given up, and phenomena are
15 Id.at 208.
16 The seven works are John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Raciocinativeand Inductive (1843),John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton'sPhilosophy (1866),
John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865),John Stuart Mill, Considerations
on Representative Government (1861),John Stuart Mill, DissertationsandDiscussions:Political, Philosophica4 and Historical (1859), John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy
(1848), and John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863).

See Little, supra note 11, at 169,

171, 173-74. In addition, Holmes read extensively in the contemporary critical commentary on Mill, includingJohn Henry Bridges, The Unity of Comte's Life andDoctrine:A

Reply to Strictures on Comte's Later Writings, Addressed toJS. Mill (1866), David Masson, A
Recent BritishPhilosophy (1865), James McCosh, An Examination of Mr.JS.Mill'sPhilosophy (1866), and Herbert Spencer, Mill Versus Hamilton: The Test of Truth, 1 FORT. REV.
531 (1865). For a reproduction of this reading list, see Little, supra note 11, at
171-74. Holmes's reading of Mill was accompanied by extensive reading of other
English and American positivists, including George Henry Lewes, The BiographicalHis-

tory of Philosophy (1857), Aristotle, and Chauncey Wright's devastating, rigorously positivist review of Herbert Spencer's work. See Little, supra note 11, at 170.
17 For a careful discussion of Mill's positivism, see W.M. SIMON, EUROPEAN PosITIVISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. AN ESSAY IN INTELLECrUAL HISTORY 172-201

(1963).

18 JOHN STUART MILL, Auguste Comte and Positivism, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL 261 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969).
19

See Little, supra note 11, at 169.

20

See MILL, supra note 18, at 265.
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explained by their relationships to other phenomena. As Mill explained it,
We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any
fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or
of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same
in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link
phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite
them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The
2
laws of phzenomena are all we know respecting them. '
These laws of phenomena are all men have ever wanted or
needed to know, however, since
the knowledge which mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which they most needed, was foreknowledge....
When they sought for the [metaphysical] cause, it was mainly in
order to control the effect, or if it was uncontrollable, to foreknow
and adapt their conduct to it. Now, all foresight of phenomena,
and power over them, depends on knowledge of their
sequences .... 22
The heavy emphasis on positivism in Holmes's reading during his
formative years gives us this hypothesis: in his own later work in legal
theory, Holmes attempted to apply the positivism of Mill and Comte
to the law. Reading Holmes's work in light of his early reading seems
to confirm that hypothesis, as the next Section suggests.
Before we move on to examine the evidence confirming that hypothesis, however, we need to be very clear about the meaning of the
term "positivism" in the hypothesis. "Positivism" as applied to the law
may have a number of meanings different than the one exclusively
intended here. It might mean the legal positivism ofJohn Austin, who
carefully distinguished between law and morality by defining "positive
law" as rules that were commands of the sovereign and, hence, were
laws by virtue of their being "laid down" by the sovereign. 23 It might
mean the textual positivism of statutory law, which holds that all law
21

Id.

22 Id. at 266. Mill was not as fastidious as Comte, for Mill accepted these scientific
laws of antecedence and consequence as laws of causal relationships between phe-

nomena, although Mill agreed that ultimate or efficient (metaphysical) causes cannot
be known. See id. at 292-94.
23 Austin thus shared the conception of the nineteenth-century German Pandectists that law was a positive science "in which the rules of law and how to apply them
were drawn exclusively from the system, concepts, and doctrinal principles: extralegal
values or aims, whether religious, social, or scientific, were denied any title to create
or alter the law." FRANz WmACER, A HISTORY OF PRivATE LAw IN EUROPE 341 (Tony
Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1995).
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comes from the state legislature and exists only by the legislature's
command. It might mean one of the modem variants of philosophical positivism:2 4 logicalpositivism,which focuses on meaning, logic, and
verifiability; analytic or naturallanguagephilosophy, which focuses on
the meaning and logic of natural language; and evolutionary positivism,
d la Herbert Spencer, 25 which sees universal progress in all fields of
24 For a helpful attempt to distinguish the quite different philosphies that share
the common label "positivism," see Nicola Abbagnano, Positivism, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 414-19 (Nina Langiulli trans. & Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
25 Many people believe that Holmes was a follower of Herbert Spencer and that
Holmes, too, was a social Darwinist. A leading example of this interpretation of
Holmes is Jan Vetter's 1984 article on Holmes. SeeJan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes,
Holmes and Evolution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 343 (1984). Vetter claimed that Holmes's evolutionary theory in The Common Law was a social Darwinist theory. Social Darwinists
believed that the law of survival of the fittest applied to human beings, classes, societies, or cultures: thus, human evolution favored the fittest. See, e.g., HERBERT SPENCER,
THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY 324-49 (University of Mich. Press 1961) (1873). See generally
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWviNIsM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1955);
DAVID WILTSHIRE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HERBERT SPENCER (1978).
The weakness of Vetter's view can be seen by asking a simple question: if Holmes was
a social Darwinist, what class, group, individual, or society is the beneficiary of the
process of natural selection that results in the "survival of the fittest"? The question
has no answer because Holmes's theory is a theory of the evolution of the human
thought about law and the concomitant evolution of legal standards. Those standards, he thought, become more rational and scientific as the accumulated experience of mankind provides us with more positive knowledge. This is scientific, gnostic
progressivism, not social Darwinism. Vetter nevertheless attempts to answer the question by saying that the evolution Holmes traced benefits the "supreme power in the
community," the ordinary reasonable man. Vetter, supra, at 366. But this is absurd.
Throughout The Common Law, Holmes recognized that the ordinary reasonable man
was a fiction, used in the intermediate general standard of liability to get the jury's
judgment about the teaching of experience or the community's objective standard of
moral blameworthiness. See HOLMES, supranote 6, at 88-89, 119-21. No self-respecting social Darwinist would have said that natural selection favors a fictional entity.
Vetter used Holmes's 1873 commentary on the Gas-Stoker's Strike to support a
social Darwinist reading of Holmes. Holmes, The Gas-Stoker's Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 583
(1873), reprinted in 44 HARv. L. REV. 795 (1931). In that commentary, Holmes stated,
"the more powerful interests [in the community] must be more or less reflected in
legislation; which, like every other device of man or beast, must tend in the long run
to aid the survival of the fittest." Id. at 796. This seems a clear adoption of the social
Darwinist position until one puts it into its full context. Holmes wrote in response to
an article in The FortnightlyReview accusing the courts of implementing class legislation in jailing striking workers. Holmes used that occasion to attack Herbert Spencer's theory of legislation in Spencer's The Study of Sociology (serialized in 1872 and
published in 1873). In doing so, Holmes used Spencer's own theories against him.
First, Holmes pointed out that it was anomalous "that believers in the theory of evolution and in the natural development of institutions by successive adaptations to the
environment, should be found laying down a theory of government intended to estab-
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reality, modeled on Danvinian biological evolution, from the simple
to the complex and from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. As
used in this Article, "positivism" refers exclusively to the philosophical
positivism of Comte and Mill and does not refer to any of these other,
different meanings of positivism.
B.

The FirstFourLectures in The Common Law: Holmes's Positivist
Theories of Common Law Development and the Evolution of
Liability Standards

Reading the first four lectures in The Common Law while looking
back at the positivist works of Mill that Holmes had read suggests that

lish its limits once for all by a logical deduction from axioms." Id. at 795. Second,
Holmes used Spencer's theory that legislation cannot eliminate burdens but can only
shift them to argue against Spencer's condemnation of "class legislation." Id. All legislation is class legislation, said Holmes, as it merely shifts a burden from one class to
another. Spencer cannot criticize any legislation as class legislation, then, because
legislation cannot be anything else, and because all legislation necessarily furthers the
survival of the fittest. Even legislation honestly intended to promote the greatest
good of the greatest number is class legislation, because the greatest number is a class,
and we cannot tell "for the present," i. at 796, what would be the greatest good of the
greatest number in the long run. "The objection to class legislation," said Holmes, "is
not that it favors a class, but either that it fails to benefit the legislators, or that it is
dangerous to them,... or that it transcends the limits of self preference which are
imposed by sympathy." Id. After going on to point out our ignorance about the longrange consequences of legislation, Holmes concludes that "the fact is that legislation
in this country, as well as elsewhere, is empirical. It is necessarily made a means by
which a body, having the power, put burdens which are disagreeable to them on the
shoulders of somebody else." Id.
Holmes's commentary on the Gas Stoker's Strike, then, was a subtle and devastating attack on Herbert Spencer, the social Darwinist guru; it was not a follower's
friendly, constructive criticism. First, it adopts Spencer's social Darwinist assumptions
to use against him. Second, it reduces the "survival of the fittest" to a truism, as we
can describe the consequences of any set of social or natural conditions as "the survival of the fittest." Third, it points out that the real problem for a theory of legislation is the acquisition of scientific knowledge about the consequence of legislation.
The current theory of legislation, Holmes thought, is still in the "empirical" stage,
without scientific positive knowledge of the consequences of different legislation. It is
a thoroughly positivist critique of a social Darwinist theory of legislation. This interpretation is confirmed by a look at Holmes's own theory of legislation, elaborated in
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.L. Rxv. 457 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the
Law], reprintedin OLvERWENDELLHoLuES, CoLLEcm LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920), and
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv.L. Rxv. 443 (1899). There we find thoroughly positivist theories of legislation, without any talk of the survival of the fittest or
natural selection.
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Holmes's overarching theory, methodology, and agenda were applica26
tions of the positivism of Mill and Comte.
Holmes put into his first lecture the historical analysis of his 1876
article, Primitive Notions in Modem Law, 27 in which he traced certain

modem laws back to their origins in the primitive notion that the
thing that caused harm ought to be held liable, whether that thing was
a physical object, an animal, or a slave. Just as he did in that earlier
article, Holmes derived from this history the practical conclusion that
we ought to reconsider and perhaps revise rules that are merely "sur26 Reading those lectures in the context of all the works Holmes had read, however, suggests that Holmes borrowed some of the details of his descriptive theory from
other writers. The two that Holmes seemed to have borrowed from most were the
German legal scholar Rudolf von Jhering and the English historical anthropologist
Edward Burnett Tylor. From Tylor's pioneering work, Primitive Culture, Holmes
adopted Tylor's famous theory of survivals, the idea that primitive notions survive into
later times. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Tylor was a Comtean positivist,
too, so here Holmes did not seem to be straying far from his central commitments in
picking up the details to incorporate into his theory.
Jhering was not a thoroughgoing positivist. Nevertheless, Holmes seems to have
borrowed a number of details from Jhering's famous book, RuDoLF VONJHERING, DER
GEIST DES RoMISCHEN RacHTs (1865) (partial English translation of Vol. I, Title II,
Method of the Study of the History of Law on file with author and the Notre Dame Law
Review, from Richard Danzig, Unpublished Teaching Materials (1975)), which
Holmes read in 1879. See Little, supra note 11, at 200. The similarities between
Holmes and Jhering are striking. Holmes and Jhering both advocated the following
concepts: the controlling theory of the process of legal development by unarticulated
implementation of social policies, the consequent superiority of the scholar in determining the "true" law hidden from those working in the legal system, the importance
of "formal realisibility" or effectiveness of the law in achieving its social goals, and the
acceptance and promotion of malum prohibitum crimes, consistent with the notion of
law as a means to certain social welfare ends. These conceptual similarities are strong.
Moreover, the hypothesis of direct borrowing finds support in comparisons of
Holmes's writings before and after 1879. The basic material in the first lecture of The
Common Law comes from Holmes's 1876 article PrimitiveNotions in Modem Law, but
the additions are ideas similar to those ofJhering: the process of legal development
and the notion of unarticulated legislative policy as the secret root of judicial decision. See HOLMES supra note 6, at 5-33; JHERING, supra, at 21-34; O.W.H., Primitive
Notions, supra note 9. Similarly, Holmes's 1873 article, The Theory of Torts, covered
much the same ground and included many of the same ideas as the third and fourth
lectures of The Common Law, but the additions are again ideas similar to those of
Jhering: the foreseeability test derivable from a legislative policy and the emphasis on
formal realisability or the effectiveness of the law in achieving its ends. See HOLMES,
supra note 6, at 63-129; JHERING, supra, at 27-34; Note, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L.
REv. 652-63 (1873), reprintedin THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS oFJusTIcE HOLMES, supra note
9, at 117; see also HOLMES, supra note 4, at vii, 253 (noting that Holmes authored this
unsigned article).
27 O.W.H., PrimitiveNotions, supra note 9, at 129-46.
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vivals from more primitive times." 28 But Holmes went further than
that in The Common Law and derived from that history a general theory of common law development. In form, Holmes recognized, the
growth of the law is logical, with each new decision purportedly derived syllogistically from prior precedents. However, in substance, the
growth of the law is not logical but legislative: judges faced with old
precedents based on outmoded notions will find new policy reasons
for the old rules, and those new policies will subsequently control
their development. The growth of the law thus reflects changes in the
underlying legislative grounds of decision:
Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact
and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views
of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
29
policy in the last analysis.
Holmes used the term "policy" throughout the lectures to refer to the
consequences to society of a particular rule or decision. 30
Consistent with this theory of common law development,
Holmes's general theory of civil and criminal liability was evolutionary. Holmes attempted to point out and justify a "tendency" in the
progress of the law.3 1 Holmes traced the same progression of liability
standards in both tort and criminal law, which he saw had both started
with standards of personal moral blameworthiness, based on the passion for revenge. The public policy furthered by those standards was
that of preserving the peace by satisfying the passion for vengeance,
which would, if unsatisfied, erupt into socially disruptive private retribution.3 2 The law had moved on from that primitive beginning. Retaining the language of morals-malice, intent, and negligence-the
law evolved into a general, external standard of what would be morally
28

HoLMES, supra note 6, at 33.

29 Id. at 32.
30 See, e.g., id. at 16 (discussing the "true reason" for liability of shipowners and
innkeepers); id. at 26-27 (discussing "hidden ground s] of policy" for holding a ship
itself liable in maritime law); id at 28 (suggesting a "plausible explanation of policy"
for treating freight as "the mother of [seamen's] wages"); id- at 115 (suggesting two
policies underlying an objective standard of tort liability).
31 Id at 63 (discussing explicitly this "tendency" for the theory of torts, implicitly
for criminal law); cf.id at 5 ("The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries ....In order to know what it is, we must know what it has
been, and what it tends to become.").

32

See id at 36.
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blameworthy in the average member of the community.3 3 Thus, if a
defendant acted with knowledge of circumstances from which an ordinary member of the community would predict possible harm of a certain type to others, the defendant could be held liable under that
external standard even though his motives were blameless, he himself
intended no harm or wrong to anyone, and he was not careless. If the
ordinary prudent man would have been to blame for acting as the
defendant acted because he would have foreseen danger to others,
the defendant may be held liable. Whether the ordinary prudent man
would foresee danger from a given act under certain known circumstances depends on the experience of mankind with the danger of
such acts under similar circumstances. 34 This external, general standard, linked to what would be morally blameworthy in the average
man, serves the legislative policy of protecting people from harm by
deterring dangerous behavior. 35 At the same time, it serves the legislative policy of encouraging socially desirable conduct that poses no
36
foreseeable danger to others.
As experience with certain acts under certain circumstances
makes the danger of those acts clearer, the vague liability standard still
formulated in morally-freighted terms will continually give way to
more precise and specific rules imposing liability for certain conduct
under given circumstances.3 7 These more specific standards will be
more effective in achieving the legislative policies of deterring dangerous activity while encouraging socially desirable conduct.-3 That is so
because the specific standards are more fixed, definite, and certain
than the vague standard of moral blameworthiness in the average
man. Hence, the rules are more easily knowable and can more effectively influence peoples' behavior through their threat of criminal or
civil liability.
This evolutionary development through three distinct phases
shows progress on two levels. First, the law as law improves. Since law
is aimed only at external results, it improves as its liability standards
become more objective and, consequently, more effective at achieving
those external results, whatever they may be.3 9 Second, the law im33

This, according to Holmes, is true in both criminal and tort law. See id at

61-62, 86-88.
34 See id at 61-62, 119-20.
35 See id. at 42-43, 47-48, 56-57, 86-88, 115.
36 See id. at 77-78, 115.
37 See itdat 89-92, 119-21, 129.
38 See id. at 88-89.
39 See id. at 33, 42, 88-89. The general standard of average moral blameworthiness is more effective at deterring dangerous conduct because people know their per-
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proves because the policy base of the law improves. The only policy
served by the subjective liability standard of personal moral blameworthiness is the minimal one of preserving the peace by satisfying the
passion for revenge. 40 But the passion for revenge is not one that we
should encourage. 4 1 As liability standards evolve toward objective, external standards, the law starts to serve the more enlightened policy of
protecting individuals from harm by deterring conduct that experience has shown to be dangerous. 42
A number of elements in Holmes's theory suggest that it was
strongly influenced by the positivist philosophy of Comte and Mill.
Holmes adhered to two commitments in his evolutionary theory
that seem to be derived from the positivist insistence on the significance of foreknowledge, based on knowledge of the scientific laws of
antecedence and consequence. These commitments were to the external purpose of the law, which operates by the threat of sanctions,
giving men incentives to avoid certain acts,43 and to the consequent
need for the law to be knowable if it is to be effective in achieving its
external purpose. 44
Holmes seemed to apply the positivist theory that human thought
always progresses through three stages. In his PrimitiveNotions article
preceding The Common Law, Holmes had characterized the evolution
from early liability rules, based on the attenuated fault of the owner of
the causing agent, to later liability rules based on the attenuated fault
of the owner of the causing agent, as a progression from theological
to metaphysical thinking, explicitly.4 5 Holmes did not explicitly characterize the three-stage evolution in liability standards sketched in The
sonal inadequacies will not be taken into account. The hasty, awkward, and naturally
imprudent are thus given greater incentive to act safely. See id at 40, 43, 86-87.
Moreover, the final fixed, definite, and certain rules are more effective than the
vaguer standard of average moral blameworthiness from which they evolve, because it
is easier to know the specific rules and to predict when they will be applied. See id. at
88-89.
40 See i& at 36.
41 See id
42 See id. at 46-47, 61-62, 86-88. The achievement of this policy is limited only
by the need to preserve the law's effectiveness: imposing liability for dangerous conduct that would not be morally blameworthy in the average member of the community might be "too severe for that community to bear." Id. at 42; see also id at 62,
128-29. This practical limitation becomes less and less significant as the process of
specification leads to fixed and definite liability rules, based on the teachings of experience about the danger of certain conduct under given circumstances, for those rules
do not refer to moral blameworthiness in any form.
43 See id at 42, 88.
44 See id. at 88-90.
45 See Holmes, Pimitive Notions II, supra note 9, at 654.
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Common Law as progress from theological to metaphysical to positive,
but the structure of the theory tracks with these three stages. In the
first stage, liability standards reflect a primitive desire for revenge
against the causing agent, based on its ascribed evil will. In the second stage, liability standards are based on an imaginary thing-the
moral blameworthiness of the average member of the community. In
the final stage, liability rules are fixed, definite, and certain. Those
liability rules are in theform of scientific laws of antecedence and consequence, identifying particular behavior which, under particular circumstances, will be followed by particular legal sanctions. Moreover,
those liability rules are based on scientific laws about the danger of
particular behaviors under particular circumstances, discovered by
experience.
Consistent with positivist reductive epistemology, Holmes continually reduced morally-freighted terms in the law-such as intent, malice, and negligence-to descriptions of voluntary action with
knowledge of circumstances enabling a reasonable man to foresee
danger. 4 6 These reductions purge the law of metaphysical notions
and relate liability standards to scientific laws of antecedence and
consequence.
Finally, Holmes's theory of common law development can be
seen as thoroughly positivist. If the only things we can know are our
experiences of phenomena and the scientific laws of similitude,
antecedence, and consequence that we derive from those experiences, it follows that the only basis for judicial decision we can know
must be the consequences of that decision-its legislative policy.
Thus, it follows from the positivist epistemology that, whatever judges
think the reason for their decision may be, the only knowable basis for
the decision is its legislative policy-its consequences.
II.

THE CONTEXT OF HOLMES'S CoNTRAcr LEcTuRES:
CONTEMPORARY CoNTRAcr THEORISTS AND THEIR
CHALLENGE FOR HOLMES

In the late 1870s, two theories about contract were widely accepted. Those theories were the will theory of contract, in its most upto-date formulation by Friedrich Carl von Savigny,47 and Henry Sumner Maine's theory that contract law evolves from primitive formal
46 See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 89-92, 119-21, 129.
47 See FRIEDERICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN REcHTS
§§ 104-40, at 5-309 (Berlin, Veit und Comp. 1848), cited in PoTLLcK, supra note 7, at
1-2, and inJAMES GoRDLY, THE
162-63 nn.3-4 (1991).
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contracts to modem consensual contracts. 48 Before we turn to
Holmes's immediate predecessors, Pollock and Langdell, it makes
sense to examine both the common background they shared with
Holmes and the problems it posed for him.
A. Deep Background: Savigny's Will Theory and Maine's
Evolutionary Theory
Since 1806, one form or another of the will theory of contract
had dominated the thinking about the substantive law of contract in
England and the United States. The will theory, simply stated, was
this: contractual duties derive from the subjective will of a party to
enter a binding contract and thus voluntarily to accept the associated
contractual obligations. In his work on the Roman law, the German
legal scholar Savigny had elaborated a version of the will theory that
was popular and influential at the time Pollock and Langdell developed their theories. For Savigny, a contract is just a special form of
agreement, and an agreement requires the consent of two or more
persons. Each person must have a distinct intention, the intention of
all the parties must be the same, and the parties must, through mutual
49
communication, be aware that their intentions agree.
To a thoroughgoing positivist like Holmes, the will theory of contract would seem to be a theological explanation of legal liability,
since it explains legal phenomena by reference to the subjective wills
of living beings. The will theory, to one extent or another, would divert attention away from what Holmes believed was the real ground of
all legal obligation-considerations of public policy, or what would be
expedient for the community concerned.
Maine, the most influential English contract theorist of his day,
argued that contract law developed historically by moving from objective standards of contracting (formal contracts) to subjective standards of contracting (consensual contracts). In his influential 1861
work on ancient law, Maine had analyzed the apparent progression of
contract law in ancient Rome from purely formal contracts, where the
actual intent of the parties was unimportant and a ritualized form was
the only consideration, through progressively less formal contracts to
the consensual contracts, in which the contractual obligation is an48 See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CoNNECION wrrH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCaETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (London, J. Murray
10th ed. 1884) (containing an introduction and appendices by Frederick Pollock).
49 See 3 SAVIGNY, supra note 47, at 309.
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nexed to the consensus or mutual assent of the parties. 50 Maine saw
this progression as a movement from a primitive to a more modem
conception of contract:
The Consensual Contracts, it will be observed, were extremely limited in number. But it cannot be doubted that they constituted the
stage in the history of Contract-law from which all modem conceptions of contract took their start. The motion of the will which constitutes agreement was now completely insulated, and became the
subject of separate contemplation; forms were entirely eliminated
from the notion of contract, and external acts were only regarded as
symbols of the internal act of volition. 5 1
Maine proceeded to generalize the Roman example. He concluded that the Roman progression was the starting point for modem
Western ideas of contract, based on Roman notions, and that the Roman progression from formal to consensual contracts was probably
52
typical of the development in other ancient societies.
Maine's evolutionary theory therefore seemed to be just the reverse of Holmes's general theory that law evolved by moving from subjective standards to objective standards. Moreover, Maine's
evolutionary theory seemed to buttress the prevailing will theory of
contract, for it claimed that the "modem conception of contract"
(rooting contractual obligations in the wills of the contracting parties)
is the result of an ineluctable evolution away from primitive conceptions of contract.
B.

Immediate Background: Pollock and Langdell

The obstacles posed by the will theory and Maine's evolutionary
theory were made more troublesome by the work of Holmes's contemporaries. By 1880, there had been published full-length works on contract by Frederick Pollock in 1876, 53 and William Anson 54 and
50 See MAINE, supra note 48, at 324. Holmes read this edition of Maine's Ancient
Law in 1865 or 1866, and again in 1868. See Little, supra note 11, at 169, 178.
51 MAINE, supra note 48, at 324.

52

See id.
The Contract-law of all other ancient societies but the Roman is either too
scanty to furnish information, or else is entirely lost .... From the absence,
however, of everything violent, marvelous, or unintelligible in the changes I
have described, it may be reasonably believed that the history of Ancient

Roman Contracts is, up to a certain point, typical of the history of this class
of legal conceptions in other ancient societies.
Id. at 328.
53 PoLLocK, supra note 7.
54 ANSON, supra note 4.
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Christopher Columbus Langdell in 1879. 55 Anson's was the least original of the three. He aimed to provide a comprehensive basic textbook for students.5 6 He therefore covered topics not covered in
Pollock's more limited treatise, but he followed Pollock's lead on most
matters related to theory.57 It makes sense, then, to focus on the
more original works of Pollock and Langdell. Each of those works, to
bne degree or another, combined description and theory. Each work
was more theoretically sophisticated and insightful than any contemporary work in torts. Each work showed a sophisticated grasp of the
cases and the literature. And, although Pollock and Langdell both
claimed their works were "scientific," neither Pollock nor Langdell followed the rigorously positivist tradition in which Holmes was working.
1. Frederick Pollock
The Pollock and Langdell treatises were as different as night and
day. Pollock's treatise was the more traditional of the two. Reflecting
the spirit of his times, Pollock described his work as "scientific."5 8 The
structure of his presentation suggests that he understood legal science
in the following way. An analysis is scientific if it identifies the fundamental normative principles underlying a particular area of the law,
relates basic legal doctrine to those fundamental principles, and accurately classifies the developed law using analytical categories that show
the relationships to basic principles. 5 9 The basic principle, for Pollock, was the principle identified by Savigny: mutual common intention of the parties as the sine qua non of an enforceable contracL 60 To
that, he added Maine's supporting theory that contract evolved from
formal to consensual contracts. 61 Thus, although the form of Pollock's "scientific" analysis was similar to that of the eighteenth-century,
natural law legal science of William Jones, the content of his basic
principle as a single, abstract, normative concept, rather than as a set
of natural law principles, seemed to make his legal science much less
55 LANGDELL, SuMMARY, supra note 8.
56 See ANSON, supra note 4, at v.
57 See id. at vii.
58 PoLLOCac, supra note 7, at vii.
59 Cf SIR WILLAM JONES, ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAuLMENTS 4, 123 (London, S.
Sweet 1833) (1781) (explaining law of bailment by reference to fundamental natural
law principles), quoted in A.W.B. SIMPSON, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract
Law, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HiSroRY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 176-77
(1987) [hereinafter LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY].
60 See PocK,
supra note 7, at 1-8.
61 See id at 116-52.
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like that of Jones and much more like the Kantian legal science of
62
Savigny and the German Pandectists who followed him.

Pollock's detailed analyses reflect the significance he attached to
the will theory of contract and to Maine's evolutionary theory.
Pollock applied to the history of the English contract law Maine's
theory that contract law progressed from formal to consensual contracts. Pollock saw this progression repeated in the common law's
movement from the formal covenant under seal to informal consensual contracts. 63 Pollock carried over this notion into his treatment of
consideration in the common law. First, he noted that common-law
consideration was significantly different from the modem civil law
"cause," which had derived from the Roman requirement of causa for
consensual contracts. 64 Pollock then speculated that the English consideration might be "directly descended" from the Roman causa nevertheless, since the English consideration could easily be derived from
the Roman causa by determining the "common elements in the various sets of facts which under the name of causa made various kinds of
contracts actionable. '6 5 Pollock carefully emphasized that this was a
tentative, speculative thesis; he put it forward as only a possibility. He
recognized that the history of consideration was obscure: after canvassing some of the historical evidence supporting his hypothesis, he
said, "A more complete search than we have been able to make might
perhaps be rewarded by the discovery of positive evidence on this
66
point."
In any event, Pollock's further analysis of consideration was based
in part on the premise that consideration, like causa, is a requirement
67
only for informal, consensual contracts and not for formal contracts.

Pollock thus carried over into his discussion of consideration Maine's
theory that contract ineluctably progressed from formal to consensual
contracts. Pollock saw the possibility that consideration arose in eq62 For a careful analysis of Savigny's legal science, see WIEACKER, supra note 23, at
289-316. For the German Pandectists, see id. at 341-53.
63 Pollock concluded,
[In] the ancient view no informal contract is good unless it falls within some
exceptionally favoured class: the modem view to which the law of England
has now long come round is the reverse, namely that no contract need be in
any particular form unless it belongs to some class in which a particular form
is specially required.
POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 126.

64
65
66
67

See id. at 148-49.
Id at 149.
Id. at 152.
See id at 153, 163.
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uity, the probable seed-bed for enforcement of consensual contracts,
68
as further support for this correlation.
Savigny's formulation of the mutual common intention version of
the will theory informed Pollock's treatment of the formation of contracts as well as his treatment of mistake, misrepresentation, fraud,
duress, and undue influence. In his chapter on agreement, proposal,
and acceptance, Pollock closely followed Savigny's analysis of contract
69
as a particular kind of generic legal transaction called an agreement.
An agreement, according to Pollock, requires the consent of two or
more persons: each person must have a distinct intention; the intention of all the parties must be the same; the parties must, through
mutual communication, be aware that their intentions agree; and the
common intention must be directed to legal consequences, which
confer rights or impose duties on the parties. 7° Following Savigny,
Pollock thus defined "agreement" generically: "[w]hen two or more
persons concur in expressing a common intention so that rights or
duties of those persons are thereby determined, this is an agreement."7 x Pollock then asserted that "[t]he mutual communication
which makes up an expression of common intention for the purposes
of legal agreement consists of proposal and acceptance." 72 What
makes a legal agreement so defined into a contract? Pollock
reasoned,
[In] a contract something remains to be done by one or by each of
the parties, which the other has or will have a right to call upon him
to do.... In this case, therefore, the common intention expressed
by the parties has this peculiar character, that it contemplates a future performance or performances to which one or each of them is
to be bound. On the side of the party so bound, the expression of
this intention is accordingly nothing else than an undertaking to
73
perform the thing he is bound to-in other words, a promise.
Pollock concluded with the observation that the final task in this analysis-embodying these ideas in definitions-had already been done in

68
69
70

See id. at 152, 163-65.
See id.
at 1-31.
See id- at 1-2.

71 Idat 2.
72 1& at 4.
73 IMat 5.
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the Indian Contract Act of 1872,74 which he proceeded to quote and
75
adopt as his own.

After thus identifying the main principle of contract formation"that a contract is constituted by the acceptance of a proposal"76Pollock went on to discuss the application of that principle in detail to
questions of the timing and manner of revocation of proposals, 77 the
time within which the proposal must be accepted,7 8 and the communication of acceptance and revocation. 79 Without in any way rejecting
the will theory, Pollock sensibly deferred to "common sense and convenience"8 0 rather than pure theory to resolve these questions.
74 See Indian Contract Act of 1872, reprinted in AC.PATRA, THE INDIAN ComTRAcT
ACr 1-66 (1967).
75 See PoLLocK, supra note 7, at 6. The definitions of "proposal," "acceptance,"
and "promise" in that Act are as follows:
(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain
from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to
such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal;
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent
thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal when accepted
becomes a promise:
Id.
76 Id. at8.
77 See id. at 8-9.
78 See id. at 9-10.
79 See id.
at 10-21.
80 Id. at 11. Thus, Pollock rejected Pothier's will-theory-based notion that revocation of a proposal is effective as soon as it is formally determined by the proposer,
before its communication to the offeree. Pollock argued that this "wholly overlooks the
consideration that not intention in the abstract, but communicated intention, is what
we have to look to in all questions of the formation of contracts." Id. at 10. Furthermore, Pollock argued, it is "manifestly unjust" to let "a revocation take effect, though
the other party has received, accepted, and acted upon the proposal without knowing
anything of the proposer's intention to revoke it." Id
Pollock took a similarly practical position on the question of acceptance by
mail:
[I] t is plainly just and expedient that the acceptance should date from the
time when the party has done all he can to accept, by putting his affirmative
answer in a determinate course of transmission to the proposer. From that
time he must be free to act on the contract as valid ....
Id. at 11.
Posted acceptance is neither irrevocable nor necessarily effective, however. The
acceptance can be revoked if revocation reaches the proposer at or before the acceptance. And the mailed acceptance may not be effective if it is never delivered or if it is
delayed in delivery past the time called for, explicitly or implicitly, by the proposal. By
focusing on communicated intentions rather than some mystical coincidence of wills,
Pollock was free to resolve these questions of contract formation based on commonsense notions of notice, fairness, and practical needs for legal certainty.
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The will theory of contract in its mutual common intention form

obviously shaped the basis for Pollock's chapters on "Mistake," 81 "Misrepresentation,"8 2 "Fraud and Rescission," 83 and "Duress and Undue
Influence."8 4 His analytical introduction to these chapters identified
the unifying theme he saw underlying each of these topics. Pollock
said he was now turning from "the purely objective conditions of contract" that he had dealt with in earlier chapters to "a set of conditions
which by comparison... may fairly be called subjective," and in which
"[t] he consent of the parties is now the central point of the inquiry."85
Usually, if the ordinary requirements for the formation of a contract
are met, the mutual communication of the parties constituting proposal and acceptance will be taken as sufficient expressions of valid consent to establish a primafacie good agreement. But other, subjective
conditions must be met to make the consent binding, although we
don't require positive proof that these conditions are met to establish
a valid contract prima facie. These conditions are that the consent be
true, full, and free. 6 Coercion or undue influence in the making of
the contract show that the consent was not free.8 7 Mistake, misrepresentation, and fraud are all related to ignorance on the part of the
consenting party of some fact material to the agreement, which means
that the consent given was not true or full.88
This analytical approach, relating mistake, misrepresentation,
and fraud to the quality of a contracting party's subjective consent, led
Pollock to deviate uncharacteristically from his usual, carefully accurate description of the case law. When he came to the topic of innocent misrepresentation of a material fact inducing a contract, he
recognized the traditional rule that the resulting contract is valid and
enforceable against the mistaken party. Under the mutual common
intention theory, however, this result seemed to be wrong, so Pollock
labored mightily to describe the "tendency" of recent equity cases to
89
be more in line with the teachings of the will theory.
81
82
83

Id. at 355-442.
Id. at 445-69.
Id. at 471-99.

84

Id. at 500-43.

85 Id-at 355.
86 See id. at 355-56.
87 See id. at 356.
88

See id at 356-57.

89 Pollock started off with the very general definition of consideration from the
case of Currie v. Misa, 10 L.R-Ex. 153, 162 (1875): "A valuable consideration, in the
sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing
to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." PoLLocK, supra note 7, at 147.
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Pollock almost succeeded in giving a coherent explanation of
common-law contract in terms of the will theory. The weak spot in his
treatise was his treatment of consideration, which posed a serious
threat to any attempt to rationalize common-law contract under the
will theory. The problem was this: if mutual common intention is the
basis of a contract under the will theory, why do the courts also require that there be consideration? Pollock never really answered that
question in his treatment of consideration, which uncharacteristically
lacked any clear organizing principle.
The work reflects the man. Pollock was an industrious researcher, cautious and conventional in judgment, erudite, and scrupulously honest. In this, the first of his many treatises, he analyzed a
broad range of legal materials, including English cases at law and in
equity, the Roman law of contract, and the 1872 Indian Contract
After discussing the possible historical origins of this doctrine, Pollock went on to
sketch some of the details of the common law doctrine of consideration. Pollock
covered a number of specific subtopics, without elaborating any organizing, generally
explanatory principles tying those subtopics together. Pollock discussed the rule that
the amount of the consideration is not material: courts do not question the adequacy
of the consideration. See id. at 154. In explaining this, Pollock quoted Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan: "The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of
the contractors, and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give."
Id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 75 (London 1651)). After going through a
number of cases holding that the adequacy of consideration is not material, Pollock
identified the "principle of all these cases,... [stated] in so many words by the judges,
that the promisor has got all that he bargained for." Id. at 155. Pollock recognized,
however, that "inadequacy of consideration, coupled with other things," may be evidence of fraud. Id. at 156.
Pollock went on to discuss reciprocal promises, which may be the consideration
for each other. See id, Pollock noted that a promise is not good consideration if it is a
promise to do what one is already bound to do, either by the general law or by a prior
contract with the other party. See id. at 157. A promise to do what one is contractually bound to a third party to do, however, may be good consideration. Pollock recognized a good policy reason for this apparent anomaly:
To allow promises to be binding if made in consideration of the promisee
doing or undertaking what he is already bound generally or to the promisor
to do would be to give direct encouragement to breaches of public and private duty. But where the duty is to a third person only, this reason does not
apply; the encouragement to unlawful conduct, if any, is too remote and
precarious to count for anything.
Id. at 160.
In the course of this disjointed ramble through the law related to consideration,
Pollock argued in passing for a very thin purpose for the doctrine of consideration:
"The main end and use of the doctrine of Consideration... is to furnish us with a
reasonable and comprehensive set of rules which can be applied to all informal contracts without distinction of their character or subject matter." Id. at 163.
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Act. 90 He organized the material analytically and elaborated organizing principles for each subtopic, except for consideration. The overall approach and the analysis of each subtopic reflected a thoughtful,
judicious application of the theories of Maine and Savigny to the English law of contract. In its evident industry, erudition, honesty, explanatory power, and consistency with the prevailing will theory,
Pollock's treatise was obviously destined to be influential. Pollock's
was the gold standard: thoughtful, exhaustive within its range, and
conventional.
2.

Christopher Columbus Langdell

Dean Langdell's treatise, on the other hand, was not conventional at all. Langdell invented the case study method of teaching law
and applied it to his teaching of contracts. The case method was
based on Langdell's belief that "law is a science, and... all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." 9 1 Students could learn the law of contracts, scientifically, by studying
original sources: decided cases that Langdell had selected for his pioneering casebook in contracts, published first in 1871.92 That edition
contained a complete analytical index, but no commentary on the
cases at all. In 1879, for the second edition of the casebook, Langdell
expanded that analytical index by including short essays under each
index topic. 93 Those essays referred to the cases in the casebook as
authority. He published this elaborated index separately in 1880 as A
Summary of the Law of Contracts.94 That summary was kept in index
form, however, with an essay on "Acceptance" 95 at the beginning of
96
the book, separated by 174 pages from a later essay on "Offer."
What did Langdell mean when he said that "law is a science"?
The answer is not completely clear: over the last twenty-five years,
scholars have engaged in a lively debate over this and related questions about Langdell's thought. 97 To answer the question, we must
look carefully both at what he said and at what he did.
90

Indian Contract Act of 1872, reprinted in PATRA, supra note 74.

91 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speech (Nov. 5, 1886),
in 3 LAW Q. REv. 123, 124 (1887).
92 See I C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. Ist ed. 1871).

93

See LANGDELL,

SELECTION OF CASES,

94
95

See LANGDELL,
Id.at 1-23.

SUMMARY, supra note

supra note 8.
8.

96 id at 197-204.
97 Over the last 25 years, we have seen vigorous and sophisticated academic commentary on Langdell's legal science. See, e.g., GRANT GrLMoRE, THE AGES OF AMEIcAN
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Langdell said precious little about what he meant when he said
"law is a science." He wrote about it first in 1871, in the introduction
to the first edition of his casebook on contracts. 98 He talked about it
42-48 (1977) [hereinafter GILMORE, AMERICAN LAW] (calling Langdell's science a
simple-minded formalism); GRAN GILMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 13-15 (1974)
LAW

[hereinafter GILMORE, CorrRACT] (same); WiLuIAm P.

LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERI-

ENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 55-78 (1994)

(calling

Langdell's science an amalgam of technical legal analysis of cases, a coherent classification of the law based on fundamental but technical substantive doctrines, and a
loosely-understood Austinian positivism separating law and morality); Thomas Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (calling Langdell's science a curious
combination of induction from the cases of principles, then used to deduce subsequent conclusions, analogous to Mill's inductive explanation of geometry, contrary to
Gilmore and Speziale); Matthias Reimann, The Common Law and German Legal Science,

in THE

LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.

72 (Gordon ed., 1992) (calling Lang-

dell's science similar to, but in important ways different from, Kantian formalism of
the German pandectists, thus placing Langdell halfway between Kantian formalism
and a rigorously empirical, inductive, historicist legal science); Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning ofAnti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5
VT. L. REV. 1 (1980) (calling Langdell's science empirical and dedicated to formulating working hypotheses from analysis of original sources, contrary to Gilmore).
98 See 1 LANGDELL, supranote 92, at vi-vii. In explaining how he had prepared a
selection of cases to use in teaching contract law to students, Langdell said,
[Given] the great and rapidly increasing number of reported cases in every
department of law... was there any satisfactory principle upon which such a
selection [of cases] could be made? It seemed to me that there was. Law,
considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a series
of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the
doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied. But the
cases which are useful and necessary for this purpose at the present day bear
an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast
majority are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic
study. Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less
than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same
doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which
legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each
should be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to
be formidable from their number. It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and, without
exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and arrange all
the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines; and that such a
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again in his speech celebrating the 250th anniversary of the founding
of Harvard University. 99 From these two sources, we can identify the
essential ideas Langdell thought were entailed by his notion that law
was a science. First, law must be studied scientifically, by studying the
original sources-the decided cases. Second, law as a science consists
of certain fundamental doctrines, which are relatively few in number.
Third, those fundamental doctrines grew to their current form by slow
degrees, and that growth can be traced through a series of cases.
Fourth, an appropriate classification and arrangement of those fundamental legal doctrines would facilitate the scientific study of the law.
A private letter from Langdeil to Theodore Dwight Woolsey of
Yale, recently uncovered by William LaPiana, adds an additional element to Langdell's notion of law as science. 10 0 Writing about the
study ofjurisprudence, Langdell expressed his understanding of a distinct line between the study of law as it is and the study of law as it
ought to be. He concluded that lawyers and law professors ought only
to study the law as it is. Based on the views expressed in this letter,
work could not fail to be of material service to all who desire to study that
branch of law systematically and in its original sources.
Id.
99 See Langdell, supra note 91, at 123-24. In explaining how he tried "to do [his]
part towards making the teaching and the study of law... worthy of a university," by
"placing the law school ... in the position of the law faculties in the universities of
continental Europe," Langdell said,
To accomplish these objects, so far as they depended upon the law school, it
was indispensable to establish at least two things-that law is a science, and
that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books.... But if printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge,-if every student who would obtain any mastery of law as a science
must resort to these ultimate sources, and if the only assistance which it is
possible for the learner to receive is such as can be afforded by teachers who
have travelled the same road before him,-then a university, and a university
alone, can afford every possible facility for teaching and learning law ...
[M]y associates and myself, therefore, have constantly acted upon the view
that "law is a science," and that a well-equipped university is the true place
for teaching and learning that science. Accordingly, the law library has been
the object of our greatest and most constant solicitude .... We have constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the
university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.
100 See Letter from Christopher Columbus Langdell to Theodore Dwight Woolsey
(Feb. 6, 1871), in Woolsey Family Papers, ser. I, box 23, folder 433 (on file with the
Yale University Library, Manuscript Division), quoted in LAPiANA, supranote 97, at 77.
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Langdell's notion of law as a science probably included Austin's rigid
distinction between law and morality.
Since Langdell said so little about what he meant by law as a science, we are forced to look at the details of what Langdell actually did
in A Summary of the Law of Contracts in order to understand what he
meant. In Summary, we can see Langdell at work as a legal scientist.
This work followed a consistent pattern. By examining decided cases,
Langdell isolated the fundamental doctrines applied by the courts in
contract cases, including the basic requirements of offer, acceptance,
and consideration. By careful, critical analysis, Langdell then penetrated to the true meaning of each doctrine. For example, that
method led him to the following statement of the true meaning of
"offer":
An offer, as an element of a contract, is a proposal to make a promise. It must be made by the person who is to make the promise, and
it must be made to the person to whom the promise is to be made.
It may be made either by words or by signs, either orally or in writing, and either personally or by a messenger; but in whatever way it
is made, it is not in law an offer until it comes to the knowledge of
the person to whom it is made. 10 1
He then used those meanings to elaborate a coherent, logically consistent blueprint for the law-here, the law of contract.
Langdell thus seemed to work with the dispassionate objectivity of
a scientist: isolating the true meaning of the doctrinal terms was a
matter of critical analysis; coherently applying those meanings over a
broad range of questions called for analytical discrimination and logical consistency; the resulting doctrinal conclusions were reached without injecting any normative views into the analysis. In fact, because
the fundamental doctrines themselves were stated conceptually, without reference to any moral or policy base, and the application of those
doctrines was determined by criteria of logical coherence, the resulting purified doctrinal structure seemed purely conceptual. It thus offered a self-proclaimed scientist like Langdell the opportunity to be
completely objective. Then the process of deciding legal issues under
Langdell's theory could be purely analytical.
For example, Langdell recognized that in bilateral contracts the
consideration for the first promise is a counter-promise by the offeree.
From this, Langdell argued purely analytically that notice of acceptance must actually be communicated to the original offerer for a valid
bilateral contract:
101

LANGDELL, SUMMARY,

supra note 8, at 197.
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When the contract is to be bilateral ... the offer [still] requires an
acceptance and the giving of the consideration to convert it into a
binding promise; but as the consideration consists of a counterpromise, so the giving of the consideration consists in making this
counter-promise.102

[T] he acceptance of the original offer, in the case of a bilateral
contract, must be expressed, i.e. must be made by words or signs; ...
the reason for this is[] that the acceptance contains a counter-offer.
Moreover, the reason why the counter-offer makes it necessary that
the acceptance should be expressed is[] that communication to the
offeree is of the essence of every offer. The acceptance, therefore,
must be communicated to the original offerer, and until such com03
munication the contract is not made.'
Langdell's legal science,' 0 4 based on the objective meaning of legal doctrines, was radically different from traditional legal reasoning,
which focused on the normative rationale for prior decisions. Appeals
102 Id. at 12.
103 Id. at 15.
104 It is tempting to criticize Langdell's legal science as unscientific or incoherent
or both. A number of commentators have succumbed to the temptation. See, e.g.,
GumsoRE, AMERIcAN LAW, supranote 97, at 42-48; GuIMoRE, CONTRACT, supranote 97,
at 13-15; Grey, supra note 97, at 39-53; EdwardJ. Phelps, Methods of Legal EducationI,
1 YALE L.J. 139, 140-42 (1892); Christopher G. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education

I//, 1 YALE LJ. 150, 152-57 (1892). Langdell's legal science seems incoherent or unscientific for at least six reasons. First, Langdell does not include in his base all the
decided cases on a particular topic. The subsequent induction of the true rule or the
true meaning of a legal doctrine is not an induction at all, but just reflects Langdell's
preconceived notions, which leads him to include some cases in the base and exclude
others. Second, Langdell on some questions, such as the effective date of acceptance
by mail, includes cases reaching diametrically different results. One cannot scientifically derive by induction a single rule from diametrically opposed cases. Third, the
historical contingency of current rules and doctrines recognized by Langdell's choice
of cases that illustrate the development of current case law would be abolished by
courts deciding cases the way Langdell proposes they do, for continued logical application of the true meaning of current doctrine would freeze the law at this stage in its
development. Fourth, even within the set of cases Langdell chooses, what Langdell
purports to determine scientifically from the cases is not a scientific law, or a generalized description of common characteristics of the set, but a concept of the true
meaning of a legal doctrine. Fifth, because the purportedly scientifically-determined
concept is not itself normative, Langdell does not purport to derive an "ought" from
an "is." But there is then no apparent reason to apply the concept to decide subsequent cases. Sixth, by including in the domain of cases for scientific analysis only
those illustrating or developing a particular legal doctrine, and excluding cases that
recognize that the doctrine is defeasible, when an overriding normative principle applicable to the facts suggests that the ordinary application of the legal concept would
be unjust, Langdell sets up a non-normative conceptual system of law radically at odds
with the underlying phenomena.
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to higher-order normative principles seemed to be banished from
Langdell's legal science altogether. For example, in defending his position that the effective date of a bilateral contract by mail was the date
the letter of acceptance comes to the knowledge of the offerer, not
the date it was mailed, Langdell recognized that some have argued
that "the purposes of substantial justice, and the interests of the contracting parties as understood by themselves," would be served by the
date-of-mailing rule. 10 5 Langdell responded, "The true answer to this
u0 6
argument is[ ] that it is irrelevant.'
Langdell didn't pause to explain why arguments from substantial
justice and the self-understood interests of the parties are irrelevant,
but the structure of his analysis here and elsewhere in A Summay of the
Law of Contractssuggests the following two reasons. The first reason is
that Langdell had previously established, by critical, scientific analysis
of the legal meaning of acceptance in a bilateral contract, that acceptIt may be unfair to Langdell to find his thought and work incoherent as science,
when Langdell himself always explained it in pedagogical terms. One can see Langdell's thought as a coherent whole from a pedagogical perspective, as Holmes himself
noted:
The preceding criticism is addressed to the ideal of the final methods of
legal reasoning which this Summary seems to disclose. But it is to be
remembered that the book is published for use at a law school, and that for
that purpose dogmatic teaching is a necessity, if any thing is to be taught
within the limited time of a student's course. A professor must start with a
system as an arbitrary fact, and the most which can be hoped for is to make
the student see how it hangs together, and thus to send him into practice
with something more than a rag-bag of details.
Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880); see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speech on
the Quarter-Millennial of Harvard, in 3 LAW Q. REV. 118, 121-22 (1887).
105 LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 20.
106 Id. at 21. Langdell went on, "assuming it to be relevant," to make three arguments for his position, based on the understanding of the parties, substantial justice,
and the need for certainty about legal obligations. Id. Langdell's argument is a
model of brevity:
The only cases of real hardship are where there is a miscarriage of the letter
of acceptance, and in those cases a hardship to one of the parties is inevitable. Adopting one view, the hardship consists in making one liable on a
contract which he is ignorant of having made; adopting the other view, it
consists in depriving one of the benefit of a contract which he supposes he
has made. Between these two evils the choice would seem to be clear: the
former is positive, the latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to
which no limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo. As to
making provision for the contingency of the miscarriage of a letter, this is
easy for the person who sends it, while it is practically impossible for the
person to whom it is sent.
Id. at 219 nn.3-4 (internal citations omitted).
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ance necessarily contains a counter-offer. 10 7 He had further established, by his critical, scientific analysis of the legal meaning of offer,
that an offer must actually be communicated, as "communication to
the offeree is of the essence of every offer."' 0 8 It follows necessarily,
then, that the acceptance must actually be communicated to make a
bilateral contract. Indeed, according to Langdell, this is so fundamental that the original offerer could not change it by the terms of his
offer. If he said the offer would be accepted at the time of posting the
u0 9
acceptance, that "declaration would be wholly inoperative.'
The second reason is that judicial decision based on the objectively discoverable meaning of legal doctrines is, for Langdell, the only
appropriate way to decide these questions. As Langdell showed,
equally persuasive arguments based on "substantial justice and the interests of [the] contracting parties" can be made for the opposite position, 110 so there is no objective, disinterested way using these kinds of
arguments to choose between the opposing positions. A judge who
accepted one argument over another, then, either would simply be
mistaken that one argument is stronger than the other or would be
choosing arbitrarily, or for some undisclosed reason, between two positions equally supportable by "substantial justice" arguments. Langdell's concern for scientific objectivity, therefore, seemed to support a
legal analysis that stopped at the level of legal doctrine.
We can now better understand Langdell's notion that law is a science. The scientist focuses on the decided cases. The scientist extracts, by the ordinary techniques of legal analysis, the current
fundamental legal doctrines in any particular field of law. The scientist makes no judgments about what the law ought to be, so he separates the fundamental legal doctrines from the normative
justifications given by judges and others and "purifies" those doctrines
by technical, objective analysis of their true meaning. This purification is simply a rational determination of what the law is. The scientist
then may recommend that future cases be decided by logical application of the purified doctrines, because that will simply be an application of the law as it is.
Langdell's methodology thus led him to undertake careful doctrinal analysis, focusing on the case law, and to give no weight to the
broad normative justifications for doctrine that Pollock emphasized so
heavily in his treatise. Langdell was a gifted lawyer, with a great capac107
108
109
110

See ida
at 12.
I at 15.
IM at 20.
IM.at 21.

1710

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 75:5

ity to analyze cases and relate facts to relevant legal doctrines. Langdell's Summary was, therefore, a treasure trove of separable, brilliant
doctrinal analyses. Because his overarching theory and methodology
were at odds with ordinary legal reasoning, however, it was a work in
which the whole was considerably less than the sum of its parts. This
was curiously foreshadowed in the indexical organization of Langdell's Summay, which reflected a deliberate refusal by Langdell to put
all the parts together into a coherent whole.
Langdell's attempt to achieve objective doctrinal purity led him
to reject arguments from higher-order normative principles. Langdell, therefore, did not relate his analysis of doctrine to the broad
principles of the prevailing will theory. In fact, many of Langdell's
specific conclusions seemed to undermine the will theory's normative
explanations of contract doctrine. Langdell's elegantly concise essays
contained a number of brilliant doctrinal insights, incompatible with
a thorough going will theory, which often were thrown out in just a
sentence or two in the middle of another discussion.
Thus, in discussing the old form of action for debt, Langdell concluded, applying Maine's distinctions, that the transaction underlying
the action of debt on simple contract was a formal, not a consensual,
contract."' Ever the precisionist, however, Langdell went on to qualify this use of Maine's classification: "It should, perhaps, be added,
that in strictness there are no consensual contracts in our law, as a
promise which has nothing else to make it binding must have a
' 12

consideration."

Similarly, in explaining why revocation of an offer must be communicated to be effective, Langdell gave this critique of the subjective
will theory of contract:
As to the rule that the wills of the contracting parties must concur, it
only means that they must concur in legal contemplation, and this
they do whenever an existing offer is accepted, no matter how much
the offerer has changed his mind since he made the offer. In truth,
mental acts or acts of the will are not the materials out of which
promises are made; a physical act on the part of the promisor is
indispensable; and when the required physical act has been done,
only a physical act can undo it. An offer is a physical and a mental
act combined, the mental act being a legal intendment embodied
1 13
in, and represented by, and inseparable from, the physical act.
111

Id. at 129.

112 Id. at 129-30. Langdell went on, "Still, those contracts which can be enforced
only by an action of assumpsit, though they are not purely consensual, are substan-

tially so; and they may, therefore, properly be termed consensual." Id.
113 Id at 244.
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Langdell's analysis of acceptance equally undermined the subjective will theory. Langdell recognized that an acceptance turns an offer into a promise. Unlike an offer, however, an acceptance may be by
a mental act only, which need not be communicated or evidenced by
any other act. Legal transfer of property by gift requires acceptance
by the donee, for example, but acceptance is presumed and need not
be proved affirmatively. Except for covenants under seal, however,
more than acceptance is required to make an offer into an enforceable promise. Langdell noted that "[a] physical act on the part of the
promisee .... namely, giving or performing the consideration," is also
required. 114 When consideration is required, then, "acceptance" as
something separate from consideration becomes irrelevant:
Therefore, though the acceptance of an offer and the performance
of the consideration are different things, and though the former
does not imply the latter, yet the latter does necessarily imply the
former; and, as the want of either is fatal to the promise, the question whether an offer has been accepted can never in strictness become material in those cases in which a consideration is necessary;
and for all practical purposes it may be said that the offer is accepted in such cases by giving or performing the consideration." 15
Finally, in discussing the rules concerning adequacy of consideration, Langdell said that "the promise is in legal contemplation given
and received in exchange for the consideration, and for no other purpose. Therefore, a promise can never constitute a gift from the promisor to the promisee as to any part of it."116 In his subsequent
discussion of consideration and motive, Langdell reemphasized his
point:
It must not be supposed, however, that motive, as distinguished
from consideration, can constitute any element of a contract, or
that it is a thing of which the law can strictly take any notice. On the
contrary, as every consideration is in theory equal to the promise in
value, so it is in theory the promisor's sole inducement to make the
promise. As the law cannot see any inequality in value between the
it cannot see any motive for the
consideration and the promise, so 117
promise except the consideration.

114 Id- at 2.
115 M
116

IM

117

Id. at 78-79.
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Contemporary Contract Theorists' Challengefor Holmes

Holmes, ever the diligent worker, was no doubt familiar in detail
with the current best work on contract when he wrote his contract
lectures in 1880. We have direct evidence that Holmes had read Anson and Langdell. As editor of the American Law Review he had published highly favorable reviews of Langdell's casebook, A Selection of
Cases on the Law of Contracts,as it first came out in two volumes in 1870
and 1871.118 In early 1880, he published a piece reviewing both Anson's 1879 treatise and the second edition of Langdell's casebook,
which included the essay-index, in the American Law Review.11 9 While
praising Anson's work for its style, readability, intelligence, and apt
proportion, Holmes suggested that Langdell's Summary was more original and penetrating, and further flattered Langdell by devoting over
three-quarters of the review to a critical analysis of Langdell's essayindex.120
118 See Book Notices, 6 AM. L. Ray. 353 (1872); Book Notices, 5 AM. L. REV. 539
(1871).
119 See Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880).
120 Holmes began his review of Langdell with fulsome praise:
No man competent to judge can read a page of it without at once recognizing the hand of a great master. Every line is compact of ingenious and original thought. Decisions are reconciled which those who gave them meant to
be opposed, and drawn together by subtle lines which never were dreamed
of before Mr. Langdell wrote. It may be said without exaggeration that there
cannot be found in the legal literature of this country, such a tour deforce of
patient and profound intellect working out original theory through a mass
of detail, and evolving consistency out of what seemed a chaos of conflicting
atoms.
Id at 233-34.
Holmes went on to attack Langdell's peculiar methodology, which he called "Mr.
Langdell's habit of mind":
But in this word "consistency" we touch what some of us at least must deem
the weak point in Mr. Langdell's habit of mind. Mr. Langdell's ideal in the
law, the end of all his striving, is the elegantiajuris,or logical integrity of the
system as a system. He is, perhaps, the greatest living legal theologian. But
as a theologian he is less concerned with his postulates than to show that the
conclusions from them hang together. A single phrase will illustrate what is
meant. "It has been claimed that the purposes of substantial justice and the
interests of contracting parties as understood by themselves will be best
served.., and cases have been put to show that the contrary view would
produce not only unjust but absurd results. The true answer to this argument is
that it is irrelevant .... " The reader will perceive that the language is only
incidental, but it reveals a mode of thought which becomes conspicuous to a
careful student.
If Mr. Langdell could be suspected of ever having troubled himself
about Hegel, we might call him a Hegelian in disguise, so entirely is he inter-
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It is somewhat more difficult to establish conclusively that
Holmes had read Pollock's treatise. Holmes never published a review
of Pollock's first edition of 1876 or his second edition of 1878. Moreover, his reading lists from 1876 through 1880 do not include Pollock's
contract treatise.' 2 ' A letter to Pollock dated June 17, 1880, when
Holmes was in the throes of writing his contract lectures, suggests that
Holmes had read Pollock's treatise before and was rereading it then.
In it Holmes states, "I am just now writing that part of my course
which deals with contracts and am struck anew with the value of your
book. I referred to your account of Consideration in one of my articles as the best which I had seen."' 22 A search of Holmes's prior articles, however, does not reveal any reference to Pollock's account of
ested in the formal connection of things, or logic, as distinguished from the
feelings which make the content of logic, and which have actually shaped
the substance of the law. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The seed of every new growth within its sphere has been a felt
necessity. The form of continuity has been kept up by reasonings purporting to reduce every thing to a logical sequence; but that form is nothing but
the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself presentable
according to conventional requirements. The important phenomenon is
the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and reasonableness of a
decision, not its consistency with previously held views.... As a branch of
anthropology, law is an object of science; the theory of legislation is a scientific study; but the effort to reduce the concrete details of an existing system
to the merely logical consequences of simple postulates is always in danger
of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a misapprehension of the nature
of the problem and the data.
Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
Here, then, in his critique of Langdell's methodology, is the first appearance of
Holmes's famous aphorism about the life of the law, which was repeated virtually
verbatim in the very first lecture in The Common Law. See HoLMES, supranote 6, at 1.
The importance of Langdell's work to the development of Holmes's contract
theory is suggested by a letter Holmes wrote to his friend Frederick Pollock after
Holmes gave his lectures, in which Holmes responded to some comments on contract
theory by Pollock. Holmes wrote, "I should like you to see the Appendix to the 2d Ed.
of Langdell's Cases, also published separately in a small book called (I think) ELements
of Contract. A more misspent piece of marvelous ingenuity I never read, yet it is most
suggestive and instructive." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr.
10, 1881), in I HoLMEs-PoLLoCm LE=Rs 16, 17 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
121 See Little, supranote 11, at 191-203. There are no entries in Holmes's reading
list after May of 1880, and the intense work on The Common Law lectures may have
interrupted Holmes's list-keeping. See id at 167. Mark DeWolfe Howe also noted the
absence of Pollock's treatise on Holmes's reading lists; he, too, concluded that
Holmes must have read Pollock's treatise nevertheless. See HowE, supranote 5, at 223
n.1.
122 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (June 17, 1880), in 1
Houis-PoLLocm LETr=-., supra note 120, at 14, 15.

1714

NOTRE

DAME LAW

[VOL. 75:5

REVIEW

consideration. One might conclude that Holmes had thrown this in
just to flatter Pollock.
Whether Holmes had read Pollock's treatise before the summer
of 1880 makes little difference, however, for Holmes's prior reading of
Anson, who followed Pollock on most important theoretical questions,
would have introduced Holmes to Pollock's major points. Moreover,
as we shall see, Holmes's contract lectures themselves reflect a detailed knowledge of Pollock's treatise. 123 It seems safe to conclude
that Holmes read Pollock's treatise before he gave his lectures on contract, at the latest in the summer of 1880.
This review of what Holmes brought to the table and who was
already there may help us identify the challenges facing Holmes as he
began writing his lectures on contract. First, the prevailing view of the
evolution of contract was that of Maine, who saw contract evolve from
formal contracts to consensual contracts, an evolution flatly opposed
to Holmes's view that law evolved from subjective to objective standards. Second, the will theory of contract had become the prevailing
understanding of the law, perhaps as early as 1806, and had influenced the subsequent development of the common law.1 24 It had
found a solid, scrupulous expositor in Pollock, whose treatise on the
law of contract was historically and philosophically sophisticated. A
thoroughgoing positivist like Holmes, however, would have seen the
will theory as a benighted "theological" explanation of contract. Finally, the brilliant doctrinal analysis by Langdell, while not based on
the will theory, was embedded in what must have seemed to Holmes a
naive imitation of a truly scientific, positivist methodology.
III.

HoLMEs's CoNTRAcT LECTURES,

IN CONTEXT

Holmes delivered three lectures on contract in The Common Law.
The first lecture was on the history of contract; the second lecture was
123 See infra text accompanying notes 128, 140, 156-59, 178-82, 188-90, 194-95,
200, 218-21, and 242-44; see also infra text accompanying notes 258, 307, and notes
260, 277, 309 (explaining Pollock's reactions to Holmes's work).
124 The most significant event in all this was the translation of RJ. Pothier's Treatise on the Law of Obligationsinto English by William David Evans in 1806. See PATaICK
ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr 399 (1979); J.H. Baker, From
Sanctity of Contractto Reasonable Expectations, in 32 CuRR.iNT LEGAL PROBLEMS 17, 20-22

(1979) (emphasizing the rise of substantive law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, replacing prior purely procedural common law); SIMPSON, supranote
59, at 178-81 (1987) (emphasizing needs of early textbook writers in the nineteenth

century). For an analogous proposition, see JAMEs

GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORI-

CoNTRAcr DoaRmN 161 (1991) (arguing that will theory was all that
was left after other scholastic elements of natural law theory had been eliminated).
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on the elements of contract; and the third lecture was on void and
voidable contracts. If we read these lectures against the background
of Holmes's positivist agenda in the first four lectures of The Common
Law and the sophisticated contracts treatises by Pollock and Langdell,
we may see clearly what might otherwise be obscure. This reading,
moreover, reveals Holmes's ultimate goal throughout the lectures,
which was to develop a thoroughgoing positivist theory of contract.
This reading also reveals Holmes's response to the challenge posed by
Pollock and Langdell. Holmes used Pollock's limited treatment of
contract as the basis for his own even more limited treatment, focusing on what Pollock called "objective conditions" for the formation of
contracts and on the history of common-law consideration, which Pollock had made much of and part of which Pollock called "subjective
conditions of contract"-mistake, misrepresentation, and fraud as
grounds for finding a contract either void or voidable. On each of
these topics, Holmes developed a positivist alternative to Pollock's
will-theory explanation. In doing so, Holmes made heavy use of Langdell's work, either by adopting without attribution one of Langdell's
insights or by using Langdell's analysis as a starting point to develop
his own theory, often by simply reducing Langdell's analysis to a more
positivist form.
A.

History of Contract

At first glance, the announced aim of Holmes's lecture on the
history of contract is puzzlingly modest, and the criteria for including
some topics rather than others is obscure. Holmes opened the lecture
by downplaying the importance of historical research on the "doctrine
of contract, [which] has been so thoroughly remodeled to meet the
needs of modern times, that there is less necessity here than elsewhere
for historical research."' 2 5 Nevertheless, Holmes continued, "a short
account of the growth of modern doctrines, whether necessary or not,
will at least be interesting."' 2 6 As it turned out, this modest project
became even more modest in the execution, as Holmes gave an account only of the growth of the modern doctrine of consideration,
leaving out the history of the modern doctrines of offer and
acceptance.
Moreover, Holmes surrounded his history of consideration with
other historical material, the reasons for his inclusion of which were
not immediately apparent. Holmes discussed at some length an early
form of contract, suretyship-by-giving-hostages, the early germanic ori125
126

HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 195.
Rd
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gins of the action of debt, the development of the action for breach of
a covenant under seal, and the development of the modem action for
breach of contract out of the tort action for trespass on the case in
assumpsit. The casual reader might fail to see any unifying theme in
Holmes's apparent ramble through a haphazard assortment of topics
in the legal history of contract law.
Read against the background of Pollock's treatise, however,
Holmes's diffident introduction to his history lecture seems close to
irony. To those in the know, Holmes's short account would be seen
for what it was: a careful, brilliantly argued brief against the application of Maine's evolutionary thesis to the common law of contract. To
those in the know, the reason Holmes included some historical topics
and excluded others would also be clear. Holmes included topics that
supported a positivist reading of the history of contract or that undermined Maine's evolutionary theories.
The primary focus of the lecture was a detailed history of the earliest appearance and subsequent development of consideration in the
common law. This was all a direct attack on Pollock's speculation,
based on Maine's evolutionary theory, that the common-law doctrine
of consideration ultimately derived from the Roman law causa, which
entered English law first in the equity courts that were the first to start
enforcing informal, consensual contracts. Pollock had carefully labeled his theory as speculation based on what you would expect if
Maine's theory were true. 127 Pollock's theory was, therefore, on its
own terms, a test case to determine whether Maine's evolutionary theory applied to the common law.
Holmes took dead aim at Pollock's test case. Introducing his discussion of the history of consideration, Holmes set out explicitly the
thesis he subsequently attacked, and it was Pollock's thesis. "It has
been thought," Holmes said, "that this [modem rule requiring consideration to make a promise legally enforceable] was borrowed from the
Roman law by the Chancery, and after undergoing some modifications there, passed into the common law."1 28 Holmes suggested that
this thesis was questionable, for three reasons. First, causa, the Roman
law term for what we would call consideration, was not used in England before Elizabethan times; before that what we now call consideration was always referred to in the reports as quid pro quo.129 Second,
the doctrine of consideration was fully developed by the common-law
127

See POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 152.

128 HOLMES, supra note 6, at 200; cf.PoLLOcK, supra note 7, at 152.
129 See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 200.
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courts in debt before any mention of it can be found in equity.130
Third, consideration was not required to make contracts under seal
enforceable, while it was required to make a contract in debt enforceable. 3 1 This suggests that "the rule cannot have originated on
grounds of policy as a rule of substantive law.' 3 2 The limitation of
the consideration requirement to actions in debt suggests that this peculiar substantive requirement was probably connected to the peculiar
procedures in debt. Holmes went on to augment this third argument
by sketching a plausible connection between the early procedure in
debt and the substantive doctrine of quid pro quo consideration subse13 3
quently applied in debt.
Finally, Holmes turned to the development of the action of assumpsit, out of which came the modern common law of contract. He
pointed out that assumpsit arose out of the action of trespass on the
34
case, a tort action based on injury caused by defendant's conduct.
In the earliest cases, the courts allowed an action in assumpsit where
defendant had promised to do something for plaintiff, undertook to
do it, and did it so negligently that he caused harm to plaintiff or his
property. Eventually, the courts extended assumpsit by analogy to
cases where the undertaking was simply defendant's promise, without
any further action by the defendant to fulfill that promise. At that
130 See id.
131 See id
132 I
133 See id at 200-26. Holmes's argument on this last point went like this. In the
early action of debt, if the defendant denied the debt, the plaintiff had to establish his
cause in one of three ways: by the duel, by "witnesses," or by a writing. Early on,
"witnesses" were the transaction witnesses provided for by the early Germanic and
Anglo-Saxon customary law. Customarily, a set of official witnesses were elected.
From this group, two or three men were called in to every bargain of sale, to witness
the voluntary delivery of property involved in the transaction and thereby protect the
purchaser from subsequent charges of theft Transaction witnesses were not used for

agreements that were executory on both sides because there nothing changed hands
and no later charge of theft could arise. Even after the demise of the institution of
transaction witnesses, the substantive rule that debts enforced without a writing re-

quired a benefit persisted as judicial tradition. The persistence of this judicial tradition was aided by the redescription of the common law in Roman law terms by
Glanville. But that redescription was never fully accurate, so attempts by later commentators like Fleta to construct legal arguments based on the Roman redescription
rather than the underlying common law were doomed to failure. It was the persistence of the underlying quid pro quo model of consideration that led the common

law courts to limit actions of debt to cases where the promisor received an actual
benefit, and to reject the argument that detriment to the promisee alone would sup-

port an action against the promisor. See id.
134 See id. at 216.
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point, according to Holmes, the courts realized that, at least in those
cases, assumpsit was an action to enforce a promise, so they asked
themselves whether consideration was necessary for that promise. 3 5
They ultimately decided that consideration was required, but the tort
history of assumpsit gave the courts leeway and analogies with which
to revisit the question, raised earlier in debt, whether consideration
must be in the form of a benefit to the promisor or whether it might
also be just a detriment to the promisee. The courts decided that detriment to the promisee was sufficient. Holmes conceded that this decision could have been influenced by the then-current "inclination" to
"identify consideration with the Roman causa, taken in its broadest
sense," but his analysis implied that the development was perfectly understandable as a natural development wholly internal to the common
law.136

Holmes's historical analysis thus seemed to have demolished Pollock's speculation about the origins of common-law consideration.
Holmes seemed to have shown that Pollock's underlying thesis-that
Maine's evolutionary theory applies to the common law-flunked the
test Pollock himself had proposed for it.
Moreover, Holmes's digressions away from the history of consideration all reinforced the same theme, for they highlighted other features of the history of common-law contract that further undermined
the applicability of Maine's evolutionary thesis to the common law.
Thus, Holmes argued that the common law of contract developed
with little or no influence from Roman law. Instead, its origins were
Germanic and its development indigenous, based on practices and
procedures that had specific social functions within a particular historical society. There were many different procedures to enforce what
we might now call contracts. Some of the early practices, such as
promissory oaths and hostage-giving, were clearly primitive but not
necessarily "formal contracts" in Maine's sense. Moreover, the procedure in the early action of debt was Germanic, and the substance of
the form of action for debt reflects the interaction of that procedure
37
and the early Anglo-Saxon institution of transaction witnesses.
Read in context, Holmes's analysis of the history of covenant
reveals how carefully that, too, was aimed at Maine's evolutionary theory. Holmes started his analysis by focusing on another early method
135
136

See id at 222-24.
Id at 224.

137 This, of course, directly contradicts Langdell's equation of the early law of debt
with the Roman real actions and Langdell's corollary assumption of a direct Roman
law influence. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 123-30.

20001

HOLMES'S THEORY

OF CONTRACT

1719

of establishing an action in debt-by a writing or "charter.'u 3 8 Originally, the writing was only evidence of a promise. Later, with the widespread use of seals, which were more difficult to forge, a contract
under seal (a covenant) became, not evidence of an enforceable
promise, but an enforceable promise in itself. Thus, "[t] he man who
had set his hand to a charter, from being bound because he had consented to be, and because there was a writing to prove it, was now held
by force of the seal and by deed alone as distinguished from all other
writings."'u 9 The covenant thus seemed to fit squarely within Maine's
definition of a formal contract. The progression Holmes sketched,
however, was from informal, consensual contract to formal contract,
exactly the opposite of the general progression that Maine had
posited.
Holmes then nodded to Pollock's use of Maine's classification:
"Nowadays, it is sometimes thought more philosophical to say that a
covenant is a formal contract, which survives alongside of the ordinary
consensual contract, just as happened in the Roman law.' 40 But
Holmes went on to explode that classification: "In one sense, everything is form which the law requires in order to make a promise binding over and above the mere expression of the promisor's will.
Consideration is a form as much as a seal."' 41 And Holmes suggested
that the law of covenant was breaking down, not because covenant was
an archaic formal rather than a modem informal contract, but because it was no longer seen as manifestly sensible.' 4 2
Finally, Holmes's extensive discussion of the development of
modem contract law out of the action of assumpsit, while relevant to
his history of consideration, also had an independent part to play in
Holmes's attack on Maine's evolutionary theory. The implicit argu138 See HoLMES, supra note 6, at 213.
139 Id. at 214.
140 Id. at 215.
141 Id. Compare id., with LANGDELL, SuMMARY,supra note 8, at 129-30. See also infra
text accompanying note 270.
142 See HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 215. Holmes argued,
The only difference is, that one form is of modem introduction, and has a
foundation in good sense, or at least falls in with our common habits of
thought, so that we do not notice it, whereas the other is a survival from an
older condition of the law, and is less manifestly sensible, or less familiar. I
may add, that, under the influence of the latter consideration, the law of
covenants is breaking down. In many States it is held that a mere scroll of
flourish of the pen is a sufficient seal. From this it is a short step to abolish
the distinction between sealed and unsealed instrument altogether, and this
has been done in some of the Western States.
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ment goes like this. The whole modern law of contract grew out of
the action of assumpsit, a special form of trespass on the case, that we
think of as a tort cause of action. And at least in its early stages, this
development was based on the general standard of tort liability: a voluntary act causing foreseeable harm to others. Since the early development of assumpsit occurred outside the realm of contract
altogether, one cannot fit it within Maine's evolutionary categories of
formal and consensual contracts at all. Therefore, Maine's theory that
in all legal systems contract evolves from formal to consensual cannot
be true for the common law.
B. Elements of Contract
Nineteenth-century developments in the common law posed a serious problem for anyone, like Holmes, who might want to develop a
positivist theory of contract. The common-law courts in the early
nineteenth century were faced with the task of shaping a substantive
law of contract as the old forms of action collapsed. To carry out this
task, they seized on the will theory of contract, as developed by Robert
143
Pothier, to elaborate the requirements of offer and acceptance.
These two requirements seemed to embody the will theory's teaching
that contractual obligations sprang from the wills of the contracting
parties. A positivist theorist concerned to rid the common law of any
reference to subjective wills of living beings could find the law of offer
and acceptance a significant challenge. Moreover, Pollock's sophisticated discussion of the requisites for a valid contract began with the
generally accepted doctrine that a legal agreement formed by a proposal and an acceptance was necessary for a valid contract and went
on to make explicit the seemingly undeniable connection between offer and acceptance and the mutual common intention will theory expounded by Savigny.
Pollock had asked the very lawyer-like question: What are the requisites for a valid contract? Holmes didn't ask that question. The formal organizing principle of The Common Law was Holmes's early work
on the arrangement of the law according to the nature of the relevant
legal duties. In that early work, contract was categorized as a subtopic
under the heading of duties of persons in particular situations or relations to persons in particular situations or relations. 144 We might expect Holmes, then, to ask an equally lawyer-like question: What special
143 See generally ATwAH, supra note 124, at 399-448; Baker, supra note 124.
144 See Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr., The Arrangementof the Law: Privity, 7 AM. L. REV.
46, 48 (1872), reprinted in THE FORMa[IVE ESSAYS OFJUSTIcE HoLMEs, supra note 9, at

97.
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relationships give rise to contractual duties? Instead, Holmes started
with that question, but then transformed it into what can be seen as
two purely scientific questions:
Wherever the law gives special rights to one, or imposes special burdens on another, it does so on the ground that certain special facts
are true of those individuals. In all such cases, therefore, there is a
twofold task. First, to determine what are the facts to which the
are attached; second, to ascertain the
special consequences
14 5
consequences.
After disposing of two preliminary methodological problems,
Holmes proceeded with these two tasks: first, to determine in the field
of contract the elements common to different sets of special facts that
lead to the same special consequences, and second, to identify these
special consequences. Limiting his analysis to the modem law of contract arising out of the old action in assumpsit, Holmes identified just
14 6
two common elements: promise and consideration.
Turning to consideration first, Holmes pointed out that the traditional formulation of consideration as any benefit to the promisor
conferred by the promisee or any detriment incurred by the promisee
was inadequate, even after reducing the "any benefit" alternative to a
"detriment," broadly understood, to the promisee. Focusing on a series of hypotheticals concerning consideration for the carriage of
14 7
goods, obviously based on the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard,
Holmes noted that the same detriment to the promisee-releasing
possession of the goods to the carrier-could be deemed considera145 HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 227.
146 Holmes recognized that the specific facts in contract cases are not always the
same, and so in the field of contract the search must be for the elements common to
different sets of special facts that lead to the same special consequences. Holmes
identified two common elements: promise and consideration. He acknowledged that
these elements had not always been common elements, that a promise was not necessary for liability in the older action for debt, that consideration was not necessary for

liability in an action in covenant, and that there was an historical difference between
consideration in debt and in assumpsit. Holmes proposed to analyze consideration in

assumpsit, the "later and more philosophical form." Id at 227. These brief qualifications made it clear that Holmes's descriptive theory was descriptive only of the modem common law of contract arising out of assumpsit. The cryptic reason he gives for
focusing on consideration in assumpsit rather than in debt suggests an evolutionary
justification for his limited focus. If the law, by "the very necessity of its nature," id at

33, is improving, it makes sense to analyze the latest form of the law of contracts, even
though that form may still coexist with remnants of the earlier forms, cf. id- at 30-33.
147 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (KLB. 1703). Holmes had commented extensively on Coggsin
his prior lecture on "The Ballee at Common Law." See HoLMES, supra note 6, at

130-62.
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tion under some circumstances and not consideration under others.
The critical difference, said Holmes, was the way it was treated by the
parties in their agreement:
[I] t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the

promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as
the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal
conventional inducement,
each for the other, between considera148
tion and promise.
This relation of reciprocal inducement was not, for Holmes, a
question of the actual subjective motives of the contracting parties. In
fact, echoing Langdell's earlier analysis,1 49 he explicitly denied that
the parties' actual motives were relevant. 150 For Holmes, the key was
whether the promise and the consideration are treated by the terms of
the agreementas reciprocal inducements one for the other.1 51 Holmes's
language emphasized this point-it is a relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, not reciprocal actualinducement.
This understanding of consideration, Holmes said, explains the
cases holding that a prior executed consideration will not sustain a
subsequent promise: the previously-executed consideration could not
have been induced by the subsequent promise. 15 2 It also explains why
the doing of an act in ignorance of a promise of a reward for doing it
does not constitute consideration for the promise: the act done in
ignorance of the promise of reward could not have been induced by
that promise. 153 Although these examples might seem to suggest that
the problem in each case is the actual motive of the promisor or the
actor, Holmes carefully explained each case as an instance of his principle of reciprocal conventional inducement. In the executed consideration case, the subsequent promise could not be the conventional
inducement for the consideration because the promise came after the
consideration. 15 4 As to the unknown reward case, Holmes argued that
148 HOLMES, supra note 6, at 230.
149 See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 78; see also supra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
150 See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 230. At this point in the analysis, Holmes subsequently annotated his copy of The Common Law with the comment, "The whole doctrine of contract is formal and external." Id. at 230 n.a.
151 See id. at 230.
152 See id. at 232.
153 See id. at 231.
154 See id. at 232.
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In such a case the reward cannot be claimed, because the alleged
consideration has not been furnished on the faith of the offer. The
tendered promise has not induced the furnishing of the consideration. The promise cannot be set up as a conventional motive when
it was not known until after the alleged consideration was
performed. 155
Holmes then turned to the next common element-a promise.
He started with a critique of the definition of promise in the Indian
Contract Act of 1872, which Pollock had made the cornerstone of his
treatment of promise.' 5 6 That definition is in two parts, and it distinguishes between a proposal and a promise:
(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to
abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of
that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal:
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his
assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal when
accepted becomes a promise .... 17
Holmes criticized this definition of promise on one point: the
definition limited the scope of promises to conduct on the part of the
promisor-"his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything."
Holmes pointed out that it is possible to assure another that anything
at all will happen: "An assurance that it shall rain tomorrow, or that a
third person shall paint a picture, may as well be a promise."' 5 8 The
scope of "promise," then, is not limited to assurances that the promisor shall do or abstain from doing something. And when one looks at
the case law, one sees that, unless some consideration of public policy
intervenes, the law does not limit the promise as an element in contract to assurances that the promisor himself will do or abstain from
doing something. Holmes therefore revised the Indian Contract Act
definition. "A promise," Holmes said, "is simply an accepted assur59
ance that a certain event or state of things shall come to pass.'
How is an assurance "accepted"? In returning to that question
later in the lecture, Holmes, again echoing Langdell's earlier analy155 Id. at 231.
156 See id. at 233-34; PoLiocr, supra note 7, at vii-viii, 6-8. After Holmes published The Common Law, Pollock relied less and less on the Indian Contract Act in the
subsequent editions of his contracts treatise. CompareFarxEuc POLLOCK, PRiNCiPLES
OF CONTRACT AT LAw AmD N EQUrIy xxii, 2-9 (3d ed. 1881) [hereinafter, PoLLoc,
CoNTRACTS, 3d ed.], with FREDERICK PoLLocir, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 1-8 (7th ed.

1902).
157
158
159

HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 233-34 (quoting PoLLocE, supra note 7, at 6).
HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 234.
I at 235.
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sis, 160 downplayed the importance of acceptance understood as an ex-

pression of agreement:
I find it hard to think of a case where a simple contract fails to be
made, which could not be accounted for on other grounds, generally by the want of relation between assurance or offer and consideration as reciprocal inducements each of the other. Acceptance of
an offer usually follows by mere implication from the furnishing of
161
the consideration.
Holmes emphasized that the key to contract formation is the actual furnishing by the promisee of the consideration called for in the
promisor's offer, not the expression of agreement with the promisor's
offer: "[B]y our law an accepted offer, or promise, until the consideration is furnished, stands on no different footing from an offer not yet
16 2
accepted, each being subject to revocation until that time."
An example may help to clarify Holmes's argument here. Assume A says to B, "I will pay you $100 if you will whitewash my fence
before Monday next." If B says, "All right, I'll do it," that doesn't
make an enforceable contract, even though in ordinary language B
has "accepted" the offer. A's assurance that he will pay B $100 calls
for painting the fence by Monday next as the consideration. The assurance becomes "accepted," under Holmes's analysis, when B provides the consideration by painting the fence before Monday. The
point Holmes was making, echoing Langdell, is that acceptance understood as expressed consent or assent to the offer is irrelevant to
contract-formation because the agreement is not in any event enforceable until the called-for consideration is given and the courts will infer
acceptance from the giving of that consideration.
In bilateral contract cases, of course, the promise does not call for
performance as consideration but for a return promise of future performance. For Holmes, this makes no difference to the analysis, for
the essence of the counter-promise in bilateral contract is not that it
expresses consent to or acceptance of the offer, but that the promisee's return promise, an overt act, is precisely the consideration
163
called for by the promisor.
In his later analysis of a then-vexing question-when a contract is
formed when a counter-promise in a bilateral contract is sent by letter-Holmes made clear his position that the return promise in a bi160

See

LANGDELL, SUMMARY,

supra note 8, at 2; see also supra notes 114-15 and

accompanying text.
161

HOLMES, supra note 6,

162
163

Id.
See id. at 240.

at 238.
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lateral contract is simply the conduct that is the consideration called
for by the promisor:
[W]henever the obligation is to be entered into by a tangible sign,
as, in the case supposed, by letter containing the return promise,
and the consideration for and assent to the promise are already
given, the only question is when the tangible sign is sufficiently put
into the power of the promisee. [And that is when the offeree
drops the letter containing the counter-promise in the letter-box,
because then he] does an overt act, which by general understanding
renounces control over the letter, and puts it into a third hand for
the benefit of the offeror .... [T] he making of a contract does not
depend on the state of the parties' minds, it depends on their overt
acts. When the sign of the counter promise is a tangible object, the
contract is completed when the dominion over that object
changes.'6
Holmes had analyzed the two common elements of contract.
Consideration is a detriment to the promisee-that is, "by the terms
of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise.' 65 A promise is "an accepted assurance that a
certain event or state of things shall come to pass."' 66 Significantly,
each of these elements is an objectively-determinable, observable fact
or set of facts. What counts as consideration can be determined by
observing the terms of the agreement. The "promise" is an observable
act by the promisor that constitutes an assurance that a certain state of
things shall come to pass. The assurance is "accepted" when the consideration called for by the agreement is given. And that, too, is a
simple matter of fact.
Consistent with his announced methodology, Holmes went on to
discuss the special consequences attached to these special facts. The
answer to the consequences question must have seemed obvious to
Holmes after his analysis of promise, for he simply identified the consequences without any preliminary argument. "If the promised event
does not come to pass," Holmes said, "the [promisor's] property is
sold to satisfy the damages, within certain limits, which the promisee
has suffered by the failure."'1 67 This identification of the consequences after the promised event does not come to pass allowed
Holmes to go back to the time the promise was made and identify "the
immediate legal effect of what the promisor does."' 68 The immediate
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
IM at 230.
IMat 235.
IM
IM
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legal effect, said Holmes, is that the promisor "takes the risk of the
event, within certain defined limits, as between himself and the promisee."' 69 This description of the immediate legal effect applies equally
to "a binding promise that it shall rain tomorrow"' 70 and a binding
promise that the promisor will deliver a bale of cotton, since the consequences of a binding promise at common law are not affected by
the degree of power that the promisor possessed over the promised
17 1
event.
Holmes said that one of the advantages from stating the common-law meaning of promise and contract in terms of taking the risk
of the event is that it "free [s] the subject from the superfluous theory
that contract is a qualified subjection of one will to another, a kind of
limited slavery."' 72 Holmes believed that his identification of the consequences of a legally binding promise refutes that form of the will
theory. "The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise
is," Holmes said, "that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the
promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free
from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and
therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.' 73 To those who
would raise the specific performance remedy as an argument against
this position, Holmes had three answers. First, his is a theory of the
common law of contract and specific performance is an equitable
remedy that is not available in every case because it is not, strictly
speaking, part of the common law. Second, the specific performance
remedy does not force the breaching party to do precisely what he
promised, because it is only available after the defendant has
breached the contract by failing to do what he promised at the promised time. Third, even in specific performance, the court does not
make the defendant fulfill his promise-it just puts him in jail if he
1 74
does not obey the court's order to do so.

This summary of Holmes's elements lecture allows us to appreciate Holmes's accomplishment. In the teeth of case law adopting offer
and acceptance as requisites for a valid contract and in the teeth of
Pollock's persuasive argument that offer and acceptance embodied
the mutual common intention form of the will theory, Holmes dispensed with offer and acceptance altogether. Instead of offer, acceptance, and consideration as the elements, Holmes has promise and
169
170
171

Id.
Id.
See id.

172 I&
173

Id. at 236.

174

See id
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consideration. Although promise is defined as an "accepted assurance
that [an] event... shall come to pass," 175 it turns out that the assurance is accepted not by the expression of consent but simply by the act
of providing the consideration called for by the promisor.
Holmes thus presented the elemental law of contract as a positive
law of antecedence and consequence. The antecedents were promise,
consideration, and failure of the promised event; the consequence
was a court order to the promisor to pay damages to the promisee,
which, if not obeyed, led to the consequence that the promisor's
property is taken and sold, pursuant to the judicial judgment, to satisfy the damages. Each of the elements was reduced to a description
of observable physical acts, eliminating all reference to the subjective
wills of human actors. A promise is an accepted assurance that an
identified event will happen, where the observable communicative
conduct of the promisor identifies whether an assurance is made, the
conduct of the promisee called for in return for the promise, and the
assured event. Acceptance is determined by observable phenomenawhether the called-for consideration is in fact given. Consideration is
what is designated as the conventional inducement for the promise by
the observable conduct of the parties. Failure of the assured event is
an observable fact. The step-by-step consequences are also observable
phenomena. A court orders the promisor to pay damages; if the
promisor does not pay as ordered, his property is seized to satisfy the
judgment.
From this law of antecedence and consequence, Holmes derived
the immediate "legal consequence" of the contracting conduct of
promise and consideration. 176 This legal consequence is based on the
prediction of fact one can make from knowing the relevant law of
antecedence and consequence. If you promise (and the promisee
gives) the called-for consideration, you will be ordered by a court to
pay damages to the promisee if the assured event does not occur.
This prediction, based on a scientific law of antecedence and consequence, is the foreknowledge that the positivist says is all we can know
and all we need to know. Moreover, the immediate legal consequence
of entering into a contract-that the promisor takes upon himself the
risk that the assured event will not occur-does not require that the
promisor intended to take that risk, as the "consequence" is simply
another way of stating the prediction of fact one may make scientifically after observing certain phenomena to which a known scientific
law of antecedence and consequence applies.
175
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Holmes's purely objective analysis of the contract elements eliminates the traditional moral terminology, with its whiff of the theological or metaphysical stages of thought, from the core of contract law.
Promise as redefined has the moral neutrality of a weather forecast: it
is not, after all, a promise to do something, but just an accepted assurance that a certain event will happen. A direct corollary of the redefined promise is that the term "breach," with its moral connotations of
breach of promise, is replaced by the morally neutral "failure of the
promised event." Consequently, the morally significant reliance on
another's fulfilling his contractual promise is replaced by the morally
neutral reliance on the judicial remedy in case the assured event fails
to occur. Finally, although Holmes is careful not to say it, the immediate consequence of entering a contract, for Holmes, is not that one
has a legal and moral "duty" to perform one's contractual obligation.
The only consequence is that one has assumed the risk that the assured event will not occur. This foreshadows what Holmes made clear
later in The Path of the Law: "[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a
prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made
1 77
to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court."
Holmes explicitly banished from his description of the elements
of contract any reference to the subjective wills or intentions of the
parties. Given the positivist antipathy to explanations of phenomena
by invoking the wills of living beings, this feature of Holmes's description seems thoroughly positivist as well.
The methodologies Holmes used in the elements lecture were
clearly positivist. Throughout, Holmes employed a reductive methodology, reducing all theological and metaphysical terms to descriptions
of phenomena or laws of antecedence and consequence. Moreover,
in Holmes's analysis of promise he employed the positivist least-common-denominator methodology, looking for that which each member
of a set of phenomena has in common with all the other members of
that set. Some enforceable promises are not promises to do something, but simply assurances that something will happen; all promises
to do something can be recharacterized as assurances that something
will happen. Therefore, "an assurance that something will happen" is
the appropriate, least-common-denominator characterization because
it fits all contractual promises.
The theory of contract Holmes elaborated in his second contract
lecture thus has all the features of a Comtean positivist theory. It is
positivist in its substance, which reduces contract law to a scientific law
177
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of antecedence and consequence. It is positivist in its methodology,
which reduces theological and moral terms to phenomena and laws of
antecedence and consequence and, wherever possible, determines significant attributes of a class by determining what all the members of
that class have in common. Finally, it is positivist in its results, as the
theory empties the basic contract terms "promise," "breach," and
"duty" of their traditional moral content and further defines an enforceable contract without reference to the subjective intentions of
the contracting parties.
C.

Void and Voidable Contracts

In each of his first two lectures on contract, Holmes seemed to
target for demolition a separate theory of Pollock's. In lecture one,
Holmes took dead aim at Pollock's notion that Maine's evolutionary
theory could be applied to the common law of contract. In lecture
two, Holmes took dead aim at Pollock's notion that offer and acceptance, understood in terms of Savigny's mutual common intention version of the will theory, were central to any understanding of the
requisites to a valid contract at common law.
What was left in Pollock's work to demolish was the entire last
half of his treatise, 178 in which he discussed the doctrines of mutual
mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, and undue influence as
"subjective conditions" for a valid contract. 179 And Pollock explained
each of these doctrines by reference to the will theory: if a party's
consent to an agreement is not true, full, and free, the contract is not
binding on that party. 18 0 These chapters in Pollock's treatise were
very persuasive: coercion or undue influence means the consent was
not free; mistake, misrepresentation, or fraud means that consent
given in ignorance of a material fact was not true or full.181 Pollock's
thorough, sophisticated analysis seemed to make of these topics a
stronghold for the mutual common intention theory.
Moreover, the underlying doctrines themselves seemed peculiarly
resistant to positivist reformulation. Take the doctrine of mutual mistake, which holds that a contract is void if the contracting parties were
mutually mistaken about a matter of fact central to the agreement.
On the face of it, it seems impossible even to state the rule without
referring to the subjective intentions or understandings of the contracting parties. Or take the doctrine of fraud in the inducement,
178

See PoLLOc, supra note 7, at 355-545.
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which holds that a party induced to enter an agreement by the other
party's knowing false statements of material fact could either avoid the
contract or enforce it, as she chose. On its face, this rule suggests that
the agreement is binding on the defrauder because his consent was
knowing, but not binding on the defrauded because her consent was
based on ignorance.
Holmes's third lecture can be seen as an ingenious response to
the challenge posed by Pollock's analysis of these "subjective condition" doctrines. Holmes shifted the initial focus away from the individual doctrines. He focused instead on the judicial remedies and
categorized those cases as void contracts or voidable contracts. He
attempted to show that a contract was void only when one of the objective elements of a contract was missing.18 2 He attempted to show

that a contract was voidable only for failure of an express or an objec18 3
tively implied condition in the contract.
This reading of the third lecture shows it following the pattern set
in Holmes's first two lectures on contract. The coverage and content
of the third lecture provide additional reasons to believe Holmes
aimed to provide a positivist alternative to Pollock's "subjective condition" doctrinal analysis. First, there is the coverage argument.
Holmes's treatment of void and voidable contracts covered all of the
ground covered by Pollock's analysis of the "subjective condition" doctrines, even though some of Pollock's doctrines (undue influence and
coercion, for example) are covered only by entailment without specific discussion. Moreover, the extra topics covered by Holmes and
not by Pollock-conditions, implied conditions, warranties, and dependent and independent promises-are all outside the scope of the
title of the lecture, which was "void and voidable contracts," and seem
to be included because they are all necessary to carry out Holmes's
central analytical move to explain all voidable contract cases as cases
involving failure of express or objectively implied conditions. Second,
there is the content argument. The theories of void and voidable contracts that Holmes developed are in fact wholly positivist alternatives
to the subjective-consent explanations by Pollock. Moreover, in the
details, as we shall see, Holmes continued to tee up Pollock's positions
for subsequent attack.
1. Void Contracts
Holmes stated his basic thesis about void contracts at the beginning of the third lecture:
182
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When a contract fails to be made, although the usual forms have
been gone through with, the ground of failure is commonly said to
be mistake, misrepresentation or fraud. But I shall try to show that
these are merely dramatic circumstances, and that the true ground
is the absence of one or more of the primary elements, which have
been shown, or are seen at once, to be necessary to the existence of
84

a contract.1

Holmes presented three kinds of cases to support this thesis:
cases in which an offer is made to an unauthorized agent; cases in
which a proper name, understood differently by the two contracting
parties, is used to identify the subject matter of the agreement; and
cases in which the terms of the contract seem to be consistent but in
fact contradict themselves on a matter fundamental to the bargain. In
each of these cases, Holmes argued, there was no contract in the first
place.
In the case of an offer "accepted" on behalf of a principal by an
unauthorized agent, there is no contract because the promise offered
to the alleged principal was not accepted by him, and the alleged principal gave no consideration. "In such a case," said Holmes, "although
there is generally mistake on one side and fraud on the other, it is very
clear that no special doctrine need be resorted to, because the primary elements of a contract explained in the last Lecture are not yet
85
present."1
In discussing the second kind of case, Holmes focused on the
famous Raffles v. Wichelhaus case,' 8 6 where a contract identified the
subject matter by a single proper name differently understood by the
parties as identifying two different things, each called by the same
proper name. The contract was for a cargo of cotton "to arrive ex
Peerless from Bombay"; there were two different ships called "Peerless"; one party meant one and the other meant the other.1 8 7 Holmes
began his analysis by setting out the will-theory reasoning of Pollock:' 88 "It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because of
mutual mistake as to the subject matter, and because therefore the
parties did not consent to the same thing."18 9 Holmes rejected that
explanation. "The law," he said, "has nothing to do with the actual
state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by
184 Id. at 241.
185 Id.; see also PoLLOc, supra note 7, at 356-57.
186 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. D. 1864).
187 See id. at 375.
188 See PoLLOc, supra note 7, at 373-74, 386-89.
189 HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 242.
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externals, and judge parties by their conduct."1 9 0 For Holmes, then,
"[t] he true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a
different thing,... but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff
offered one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another."'u 9
This is so because a proper noun, in common usage, means "one indi1 92
vidual thing, and no other."'
In discussing the third case, in which essential terms are, in fact,
inconsistent, Holmes used as an example a case in which a contract
was for "these barrels of mackerel," when the designated barrels in
fact contained salt. 193 Again, Holmes began his analysis by setting out
Pollock's will-theory explanation: "It is commonly said that the failure
of the contract in such a case is due to the fact of a difference in kind
between the actual subject-matter and that to which the intention of
the parties was directed."' 9 4 Holmes rejected that explanation and
offered another:
It is perhaps more instructive to say that the terms of the supposed
contract, although seemingly consistent, were contradictory in matters that went to the root of the bargain. For, by one of the essential
terms, the subject-matter of the agreement was the contents of certain barrels, and nothing else, and, by another equally important, it
was mackerel, and nothing else; while, as a matter of fact, it could
not be both, because the contents of the barrels were salt. As
neither term could be left out without forcing on the parties a contract which they did not make, it follows that A cannot be required
to accept, nor B to deliver either these barrels of salt, or other barrels of mackerel; and without omitting one term, the promise is
meaningless. 195

Holmes then proceeded to apply this principle of repugnancy to
a number of different cases. First, he concluded that not just any inconsistency in contractual terms would serve to make the contract
void. "The repugnant terms must both be very important," he said,
"so important that the court thinks that if either is omitted, the contract would be different in substance from that which the words of the
parties seemed to express." 196 Second, Holmes concluded that the
repugnant terms had to be in the contract itself, either expressly or by
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id.
Id.
IdSee id. (citing Gardner v. Lane, 98 Mass. 517 (1868)).
Id. at 243; see also PoLLocK, supra note 7, at 373-74, 391-97.
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a supportable construction of the agreement. This conclusion was
supported by Holmes's objective theory of contract formation:
Where parties having power to bind themselves do acts and use
words which are fit to create an obligation, I take it that an obligadon arises. If there is a mistake as to a fact not mentioned in the

contract, it goes only to the motives for making the contract. But a
contract is not prevented from being made by the mere fact1 97
that
one party would not have made it if he had known the truth.
Holmes ended this discussion of void contracts with this summary
conclusion:
I think that it may now be assumed that, when fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake is said to make a contract void, there is no new
principle which comes in to set aside an otherwise perfect obligation, but that in every such case there is wanting one or more of the
first elements which were explained in the foregoing Lecture. Either there is no second party, or the two parties say different things,
or essential terms seemingly consistent are really inconsistent as
used.198

Holmes made it as clear as he could, then, that his theory of void
contracts was tied directly to his objective theory of contract formation. Insofar as Holmes's explanation of contract formation was
purely positivist, then, his explanation of void contracts would be
purely positivist, too. In order to support this reductive thesis about
void contracts, Holmes had to establish that cases in which courts
deemed a contract void on grounds apparently unrelated to the elements of contract formation were better understood as cases in which
a valid contract was not made in the first place. And Holmes proceeded to establish exactly that in his analysis of misrepresentation of
an agent's authority and mutual mistake.' 99
Holmes's first example was an easy case. If a person claiming to
be an agent of another misrepresents his authority and enters into a
contract with a third party on behalf of his purported principal, courts
hold that contract void. Under any theory of contract formation, these
facts would lead to the conclusion that the contract is void because the
purported principal never entered into an agreement. So, Holmes
could easily explain this as a failure to fulfill his objective elements.
The example also gave Holmes the opportunity to attack Pollock's attempt to categorize fraud cases analytically as cases of mistake induced
by fraud. "In such a case," said Holmes, "although there is generally
197 Id at 246.
198 id
199 See ida
at 241-42, 252-54.
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mistake on one side and fraud on the other, it is very clear that no
special doctrine need be resorted to, because the primary elements of
20 0
a contract ... are not yet present."
Holmes explained mutual mistake cases, too, as cases in which a
contract was never formed because an objective element was missing.20 1 So he explained Raffles in purely conduct-based terms: in that
case, although each party used the same proper name, the parties in
fact said different things. This is so, Holmes argued, because under
our language convention any formal use of a proper name is univocal. 20 2 Each party, therefore, is entitled to insist on his meaning for
the word as used by him, although he is not entitled to insist on his
meaning for the word as used by the other party. When one uses a
proper name, then, it is like pointing to a single thing with that name.
In Raffles, the parties said different things because they each pointed
to a different thing. Holmes, therefore, seemed to deliver on his
promise to explain Raffles by reference only to the externals of the
parties' conduct.
Holmes limited his explanation of Raffles to cases in which each
party uses the same proper noun, but each party, in fact, refers to a
different thing. 20 3 He re-interpreted all other mutual mistake cases as
cases of repugnancy between essential terms. 20 4 Holmes's repugnancy
theory seems clearly positivist, for repugnancy can be determined
solely on the basis of external facts: the language of the contract itself
and the state of affairs at the time the contract was entered into.
Thus, in a contract to sell "these barrels of mackerel," when the designated barrels in fact contained salt, the case can be decided without
inquiring into the subjective state of the parties' minds or the "subjectmatter.., to which the intention of the parties was directed." 20 5 One
can tell simply from the language of the contract that both "these barrels" and "of mackerel" are essential terms. But, in light of the actual
state of affairs at the time the contract was entered into, these two
essential terms are contradictory. The repugnancy conclusion can
200 Id. at 241. The example Holmes used is a special case of fraud, however, in
which the fraudulent misrepresentation concerns the authority or capacity of a party
to enter into a contract on behalf of another. Holmes did not claim, either here or
later in the chapter, that all fraud results in a void contract. Pollock uncharacteristically misinterpreted Holmes on this question. See PoLLocK, CoNTRACTs, 3d ed., supra
note 156, at xviii.
201 See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 241-42.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 242.
204 See id. at 243.
205 Id.
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thus be drawn solely from the objective, external facts. "As neither
term could be left out without forcing on the parties a contract which
they did not make," Holmes said, "it follows that A cannot be required
to accept, nor B to deliver either these barrels of salt, or other barrels
of mackerel; and without omitting one term, the promise is
20 6
meaningless."
Thus, Holmes seemed to have succeeded in his attempt to reduce
all cases of void contracts to cases in which one of the objectively discemible elements of a valid contract is not present. Insofar as his descriptive theory of contract formation is purely positivist, then, his
theory of void contracts is equally positivist. And Holmes had
achieved the seemingly impossible feat of explaining mutual mistake
cases purely by reference to the external conduct of the parties without reference to their subjective intentions or understandings.
2.

Voidable Contracts

In his discussion of voidable contracts, Holmes set out his basic
thesis clearly:
When a contract is said to be voidable, it is assumed that a contract
has been made, but that it is subject to being unmade at the election of one party. This must be because of the breach of some con20 7
dition attached to its existence either expressly or by implication.
To establish this broad thesis, Holmes needed to elaborate a general
theory of contractual conditions, which he proceeded to do. Here
Langdell's Summary again became important for Holmes, who used its
extensive treatment of conditions as a summary of the relevant law
and as a foil against which to elaborate his own theory.
Langdell's central definition was that "[a] covenant or promise is
conditional when its performance depends upon a future and uncertain event."20 8 Holmes's central definition was that "a condition properly so called is an event, the happening of which authorizes the
person in whose favor the condition is reserved to treat the contract as
if it had not been made." 20 9 There are two fundamental differences
between the two definitions. The first difference is the standpoint of
the definer. Langdell stands at the time a promise to perform is made
and focuses on the condition in that promise that makes its performance contingent on a future event. Holmes stands at the time the
condition is not fulfilled and focuses on that event and its legal conse206

Id
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quences. With these different standpoints, Langdell and Holmes define different things: Langdell defines a conditional promise, Holmes
defines a condition. The second difference is the nature of the event
that is the condition. Langdell takes the ordinary view that the condition is an event whose happening makes the promise to perform unconditional or absolute. Holmes exactly reverses the ordinary view.
The event for Holmes is what makes the promise to perform "nonbinding." Holmes's condition therefore is the nonfulfillment of Langdell's condition.
Important consequences follow from these fundamental differences. Since Langdell stands at the time of the promise, the condition
for him is a future and uncertain event. Since Holmes stands at the
time after the event he identifies as the condition has occurred, the
condition for him is simply a given-a past event. By defining condition as an event rather than a contractual provision referring to an
event, Holmes can state his definition as a positive law of antecedence
and consequence. The condition, which is an event, is invariably followed by legal consequences-the person in whose favor the condition is reserved is authorized either to enforce the contract or to treat
2 10
the contract as if it had not been made.
Holmes thus achieved a scientific, reductive definition of a condition. His definition, moreover, was applicable to voidable contract
cases as well as to breach of condition cases. In voidable contract
cases, after all, an event-fraudulent misrepresentation, coercion, or
undue influence-has the legal consequence of authorizing the defrauded, coerced, or unduly influenced party to choose whether to
affirm or avoid the contract. The only difference between a conditional contract and a voidable contract lies in something outside the
parameters of Holmes's definition: whether the event was explicitly
included as a condition in the promisor's promise.
Holmes next disposed of the difficulty posed by this difference,
by turning from conditions created by the words of the contract to
conditions that arise by construction. In explaining conditions by
construction, Holmes simply assumed that voidable contract cases are
cases of conditions by construction, since they fit his description of
the nature of constructive conditions:
The nature of the conditions which the law thus reads in needs explanation. It may be said, in a general way, that they are directed to
210 Later, Holmes made clear that the legal authority conferred by the event is the
authority not just to treat the contract as if it had not been made, but to choose either

to treat the contract as not having been made or to treat the contract as enforceable.
See id. at 249.
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the existence of the manifest grounds for making the bargain on
the side of the rescinding party, or the accomplishment of its manifest objects. But that is not enough. Generally speaking, the disappointment must be caused by the wrong-doing of the person on the
other side; and the most obvious cases of such wrong-doing are
fraud and misrepresentation, or failure to perform his own part of
211
the contract.
Holmes's argument here seems flawed. He developed a scientific
description of a condition after drawing certain analytical distinctions
from cases clearly decided on breach of condition grounds. When he
moved on to describe constructive conditions generally, he included
cases of contracts voidable for fraud or misrepresentation in the set of
cases he used to form that general description. Since he had used
these cases in developing his general description, it is not surprising
that that description later turned out to fit the contracts-voidable-forfraud cases perfectly.21 2 That is always the case when you assume your
conclusion.
We can save Holmes from this criticism if we fill in the steps that
he left out, or left to implication:
(1)

Based on a scientific, reductive analysis of traditional conditional
contract cases, we can define a condition scientifically as an event
that legally authorizes the person in whose favor the condition is reserved
21 3
to either affirm or avoid the contract.

(2) The legal consequences in a voidable contract case are exactly the
same: one of the parties is legally authorized to either affirm or
avoid the contract. What gives rise to this consequence in every
case is "an event," for example, fraudulent inducement.
(3) From a scientific point of view, therefore, traditional conditional
contract cases are indistinguishable from voidable contract cases:
the scientific definition of a condition applies equally to both
kinds of cases.
(4) Since the event that authorizes a party to choose to either affirm
or avoid the contract in a voidable contract case is, therefore, a
condition of the contract that is not expressed in the contract
itself, it must be a constructive condition read into the contract by
the courts.
(5) In exploring the grounds for constructive conditions, it makes
sense, then, to include not only the judicial grounds for construc211 Id. at 251-52.
212 See id at 253-54.
213 See id at 249.
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tive conditions that the courts explicitly say are conditions, but
also the judicial grounds for holding a contract voidable.
(6) That exploration supports the conclusion that
"[t] he nature of the conditions which the law thus reads in ...[are,
in general, (a)] directed to the existence of the manifest grounds
for making the bargain on the side of the rescinding party, or the
accomplishment of its manifest objects . . . [and (b)] generally
speaking, the disappointment must be caused by the wrong-doing of
the person on the other side; and the most obvious cases of wrongdoing are fraud and misrepresentation, or failure to perform his
own part of the contract."

2 14

Once we have filled in the steps, we can see how Holmes probably
got from his expressed position in step one to his expressed conclusion in step six. As reconstructed, of course, the argument is not obviously circular. Because of the persistent methodological importance
of objective legal consequences in this reconstructed chain of reasoning, it seems to be clearly positivist.
The rest of the chapter, equal in length to the discussion up to
that point, was given over to conditions by construction related to representations of fact. 215 Holmes divided this discussion into three
parts: those conditions by construction related to representations of
fact not contained in the contract, those related to representations of
fact contained in the contract, and those related to representations in
the contract that certain facts will be true-contractual promises,
21 6
under Holmes's definition.
Holmes began his discussion of constructive conditions related to
representations outside the contract with an analysis of misrepresentation outside the contract that leads to the contract but that is not
fraudulent. 2 17 He asked whether that misrepresentation authorizes
rescission of the contract. 2 18 That was the question that Pollock, beguiled by the will theory, had labored so mightily to answer in the
affirmative. 2 19 Holmes's analysis was short and unequivocal. He recognized that a promisor relying on the misrepresentation to his detriment could argue that he was harmed just as much when the

214 Id. at 251-52.
215 See i&at 252-64.
216 See id.
217 See id. at 252.
218 See id.
219 See id.
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promisee believed the representation was true as when the promisee
knew the representation was false. 220 Holmes continued,
But it has been shown, in an earlier Lecture, that the law does not

go on the principle that a man is answerable for all the consequences of all his acts. An act is indifferent in itself. It receives its
character from the concomitant facts known to the actor at the

time. If a man states a thing reasonably believing that he is speaking
from knowledge, it is contrary to the analogies of the law to throw

the peril of the truth upon him unless he agrees to assume that
peril, and he did not do so in the case supposed, as the representa-

221
tion was not made part of the contract.
Holmes recognized that the law was different when the misrepresentation leading to but not contained in the contract was fraudulent.
In that case, the defrauded party may rescind the contract. Holmes
admitted that this seems to be at odds with his objective theory of
contract.2 22 Fraudulent misrepresentations that induce another to
enter the contract seem to relate only to the subjective motive for
making the contract when they are not included in the contractual
language. Those representations, therefore, do not seem relevant to
the objective acts that form the elements of a valid contract. They do
not affect the interpretation of the contractual language. Moreover,
because the words of the contract do not incorporate the misrepresentations, the words are not repugnant. How then is the general rule
about fraud in the inducement consistent with Holmes's theory?
Holmes's answer was simple: "It is no doubt only by reason of a condition construed into the contract that fraud is a ground of rescission."223 And the substance of that condition, for Holmes, is not that
the representations leading to the contract are true, "but that the
224
promisee has not lied to [the promisor] about material facts."

Holmes's position that a contract is voidable for fraud in the inducement because the fraud violates a constructive condition entails a
corollary position. The corollary, as stated by Holmes, is this: "Parties
could agree, if they chose, that a contract should be binding without
regard to truth or falsehood outside of it on either part."22 5 That is, if
fraud in the inducementjust violates a constructive condition, the parties, by explicit language, could block this constructive condition, just
220
221
222
223
224
225
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as they can block with explicit language any other constructive
condition.
Holmes then turned to three possibilities posed by representations of fact contained in a bilateral contract, but without language
explicitly making the truth of the representation a condition. 22 6 The
first two were simple cases Holmes treated cursorily. If the representation is false because of a mistake about a fact that has no bearing on
the bargain, the falsity of the representation has no legal consequences. If the representation is fraudulent and misled the other
party, the contract would be voidable "on the same principles as if the
presentation had been made beforehand." 22 7 Holmes paid the most
attention to the third possibility, in which the representation of fact is
deemed a warranty, even though it was not fraudulent. Holmes said
the question of whether the representation is a warranty "is ... to be
determined by the court on grounds of common sense, looking to the
meaning of the words, the importance in the transaction of the facts
which the words convey, and so forth."228 Also, Holmes said that
when a judge decides that a representation is a warranty, he really
means that the party using the words of description "binds himself to
answer for their truth," and that "their truth is a condition of the contract."229 Holmes's analysis thus subsumed all warranty cases under
his constructive condition category.
Holmes himself, however, had a problem with including certain
warranty cases in the constructive condition category. When the warranty touches "the present condition of the subject-matter of the contract,"230 as in the leading case of Behn v. Burness,2 3' Holmes would
characterize the breach of warranty as one of repugnant essential
terms. In Behn, the contract was for lease of the plaintiff's ship, described in the agreement as then in the port of Amsterdam, but which
did not arrive in Amsterdam until four days later.2 32 Under Holmes's

prior analysis, then, the contract would be void for repugnant essential terms rather than voidable for breach of warranty.
So Holmes was faced with a puzzle: why would courts in cases like
Behn hold the contract voidable instead of holding it void, as Holmes's
repugnancy theory would suggest? After rejecting explanations in
terms of the time of passage of title or the distinction between "mat226
227
228
229

See id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257.
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122 Eng. Rep. 281 (Ex. Ch. 1863).
See id. at 281.
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ters of history" and "words of description," Holmes concluded without
elaboration that "the true solution is [probably] to be found in practical considerations."23 3 After apparently dropping the matter, Holmes
went on to use his repugnancy analysis of Behn to develop further his
theory of repugnancy, in an open invitation to courts to treat cases
like Behn as cases in which the contract is void because of repugnant
essential terms:
[T] he fact is that the law has established three degrees in the effect
of repugnancy. If one of the repugnant terms is wholly insignificant, it is simply disregarded, or at most will only found a claim for
damages.... If... both are of the extremest importance, so that to

enforce the rest of the promise or bargain without one of them
would not merely deprive one party of a stipulated incident, but
would force a substantially different bargain on him, the promise
will be void. There is an intermediate class of cases where it is left to
the disappointed party to decide. But as the lines between the three
are of this vague kind, it is not surprising that they have been differ23 4
ently drawn in different jurisdictions.
Holmes's analysis is not wholly convincing. He seems to have
been driven to apply his repugnancy theory to warranties by the logic
of his position. When you have reduced a mutual mistake about a
matter essential to the contract to repugnant essential terms in the
contract, you have shifted the focus from the reason for including a
mistaken description of an essential term to the simple fact that a mistaken description of an essential term is included in the contract.
Once that is your focus, mutual mistake cases seem indistinguishable
from breach of warranty cases because those cases, too, involve a mistaken essential term. So Holmes was forced, by the logic of his reductive theory, to raise the question why contracts based on mutual
mistake about an essential fact are void, while a breach of warranty
only makes the contract voidable. And there is no real answer to that
question in Holmes's theory.
At the end of the lecture, Holmes turned to constructive conditions related to the representation in a contract that certain facts shall
be true in the future.23 5 This was the familiar question of when performance of a promise on one side is a condition to the obligation of
the contract on the other. This question had been faced many times
by common-law courts; almost all constructive condition cases decided
by the courts were cases where the question was the required order of
233 HoLMES, supra note 6, at 259.
234 Id at 259-60.
235 See i&at 260.
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performance in bilateral contracts where the contract itself was silent
on the question. Langdell had dealt with the doctrines and the cases
extensively in his treatise under the heading "dependent and inde23 6
pendent covenants and promises."
Holmes followed the broad outline of Langdell's treatment of the
topic while suggesting a policy-based, practical approach to the issue
instead of Langdell's narrowly technical and conceptual approach.
Holmes made a sensible point, supported by the case law, in his criticism of Langdell's treatment of these cases. The question of whether
performance of one party's promise should be a condition for the obligation of the contract on the part of the other party was generally
determined by the courts by the process of construction. That is, the
courts looked on it as a question of what the parties must have intended or would have decided, given basic assumptions of fair dealing
and good faith, in light of all the rest of the contract. In that process,
as Holmes pointed out, "[i] t will be found that decisions based on the
direct implications of the language used, and others based upon a
remoter inference of what the parties must have meant, or would have
said if they had spoken, shade into each other by imperceptible
237
degrees."
We may now be in a position to understand Holmes's achievement in his analysis of voidable contracts. Voidable contracts as a category posed a serious problem for any positivist theory, for voidable
contracts seemed to undermine all of Holmes's positivist analysis in
the elements lecture. The category itself includes contracts voidable
for a number of different reasons: fraud in the inducement, fraudulent terms, duress, and undue influence. In each of these different
cases, all three of Holmes's objective elements seem to be present.
236 LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 134.
237 HOLMES, supra note 6, at 261. Here, Holmes's inchoate objective general theory of construction found an appropriate field for explaining judicial decisions. It
may be possible to elaborate intermediate principles of construction based on recurrent fact patterns, such as Langdell's preferred principles of equivalency or dependence, but those intermediate principles should not be treated as rules of law or
overriding principles. In each case, the inquiry concerns what the parties intended or
would have intended on this question in light of all the relevant circumstances.
Holmes thus appropriately criticized Langdell's tendency to elevate intermediate
principles of construction into overriding rules of law. Holmes's treatment of all this
was right on target. For Holmes, the principles of equivalence and dependence are
aids to construction, drawn from recurrent forms of agreement or words chosen, but
the principles are always subordinate to the basic task of construction, which is to
determine, for this contract and in this context of social custom and tradition and
meaning conventions, what the parties must have intended on this question or would
have intended had they focused on it.
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There may be a promise, consideration, and failure of the assured
event, yet the court may refuse to enforce the contract if, for example,
there were fraud in the inducement and the defrauded party elects to
treat the contract as void. Moreover, the validity of the underlying
contract depends not on whether the objective elements of contract
are present initially, but on the subsequent decision of the defrauded,
coerced, or unduly influenced party, whose choice will retroactively
make the contract enforceable or void. Voidable contract doctrines
thus seem to undermine Holmes's attempt to reduce contract law
over its whole range to laws of antecedence and consequence, for in
the voidable contracts category, all the ordinary antecedents may be
present, yet the ordinary consequence may or may not follow, depending on the unpredictable subsequent choice of one of the parties.
Moreover, the various subcategories of voidable contracts all
seem to be based on moral judgments about whether one of the parties to a contract "defrauded," "coerced," or "unduly influenced" another. So any attempt to reduce the subcategories to scientific laws of
antecedence and consequence would seem to be frustrated by the necessity to make a subjective judgment about the subjective moral character of an actor's allegedly defrauding, coercing, or unduly
influencing conduct.
Holmes discovered ingeniously positivist solutions to these technical problems. Central to Holmes's analysis of voidable contracts was
his contention that contracts are voidable only because of a constructive condition read into them by the courts. Characterizing voidable
contracts cases as constructive condition cases allowed Holmes to set
out plausible, positivist answers to the puzzles posed by the voidable
contracts cases.
The puzzle posed by the contingent validity of voidable contracts
was solved by the constructive condition formulation in the following
way. The event that Holmes defines as the constructive condition is
the antecedent; the consequence is that the person in whose favor the
condition operates is legally authorized to either affirm or avoid the
contract. 238 One might argue that legal authority is not an objective
fact, but this does not undermine the positivist character of Holmes's
solution because legal authority can be reduced to descriptions of the
overt conduct of the authorized party: if he acts in ways understood as
affirming the contract, then certain consequences follow; if he acts in
ways to avoid the contract, then other consequences follow.
Under Holmes's constructive condition formulation, the process
of implying a condition into a contract can be seen as purely objective
238

See id. at 249.
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and scientific. Although Holmes himself did not expressly state it in
The Common Law, one can see an inchoate objective process of construction, consistent with Holmes's overall positivist commitments, in
what Holmes did in his analysis of constructive conditions. The process embedded in Holmes's analysis looks like this: One looks at the
words of the contract, which are objective facts, in light of both the
surrounding circumstances, which are also objective facts, and the
manifest object of the contract, which can be inferred as a fact from
the words of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. In light
of the words, the circumstances, and the manifest object of the contract, one can determine scientifically what conditions the parties
would have agreed to had their attention been drawn to it at the time
of contracting. One can do that by examining the experience of mankind to see what people ordinarily do in such circumstances-that is,
by discovering a scientific law of antecedence and consequence.
In his constructive condition formulation, Holmes can describe
in objective, phenomenal terms the event that is the constructive condition by reducing moral terminology to a description of voluntary
acts done with knowledge of certain surrounding circumstances, just
as Holmes had done in his criminal law and torts lectures. For example, using his objective process of construction, Holmes had identified
the constructive condition underlying the rule that fraudulently induced contracts are voidable: "[not that certain facts are true] but that
23 9
the promisee has not lied to [the promisor] about material facts."
The standard for determining whether the promisee lied, moreover,
is a purely external one: "If a man makes a representation, knowing
facts which by the average standard of the community are sufficient to
give him warning that it is probably untrue, and it is untrue, he is
guilty of fraud in theory of law whether he believes his statement or
not."2 40 According to Holmes, the standard for determining whether

the false statement concerned "material facts" is also objective:
whether "a belief in their being true is likely [based on ordinary expe241
rience] to have led to the making of the contract."
Holmes's analysis of objective conditions thus provided plausible,
satisfying responses to the technical problems the voidable contract
category posed for any positivist theory of contract. Most importantly,
after clearing away these technical problems confronting the voidable
contract category, Holmes could use his resulting objective theory of
constructive conditions to redescribe, without reference to subjective
239

Id, at 254.

240 I& at 253-54.
241 Id. at 254.
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consent, all the doctrines Pollock had included in his "subjective conditions" analysis. Under Holmes's redescription, fraud, coercion, and
undue influence allow a contracting party to avoid her contractual
obligation, not because these things undermine the full, free, and
true consent necessary to a contractual obligation, but because that
conduct breaches an implied condition in the contract.
Holmes immediately used his objective analysis of voidable contracts to devastate Pollock's theory-driven attempt to reform the law of
innocent misrepresentation. Pollock had focused on the resulting
mistake present in both fraud and innocent misrepresentation. He
saw that the mutual common intention theory would treat cases of
innocent misrepresentation the same as cases of fraud.2 42 In both
cases, the mistake of fact by one of the parties means that his consent
is not true and full. Pollock therefore labored mightily to mold some
recent equitable cases into a solid base for changing the legal rule
about innocent misrepresentation.2 43 Holmes's objective, external
standard of fraud allowed him to account for many of the cases that
might have supported Pollock's suggested trend because an objective
standard could support a finding of fraud even though the defrauding
party was subjectively innocent. In addition, Holmes's policy argument favoring freedom of speech as long as the speaker believes that
what he says is true provided a persuasive basis for the traditional rule
denying relief for harm caused by objectively innocent misrepresentations. 244 Here, too, Holmes turned to his use of what Pollock had

treated, in effect, as a test case.
D. PositivistFeaturesMissingfrom Holmes's Contract Theory: The Dog
That Didn't Bark?
Holmes's unified theory of tort and criminal law contained a
description of the evolution of liability rules consistent with the positivist theory of the progression of human thought, as well as a plausible formulation of a public policy basis for the prevailing liability
standards. These two clearly positivist elements are missing from
Holmes's theory of contract. Do these missing elements compel the
conclusion that Holmes's theory of contract was not really a positivist
theory after all?
242 See POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 464.
243 See id. at 464-67 (stating that Fane v. Fane, 1875 W.N. 161 (Eng. V.C.), was
"distinctly decided on the principle that a material statement of that which is untrue,
though innocently made, is ground for avoiding a contract").
244 See HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 252.
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Evolution of Liability Rules

In his unified theory of tort and criminal law, Holmes sketched
the evolution of liability rules from purely subjective standards based
on personal moral fault through an intermediate stage in which liability is based on the moral blameworthiness of a hypothetical ordinary
reasonable person to the final end state, not yet fully attained, in
which liability standards dispense with moral blameworthiness altogether and become purely objective rules, relating the facts of a defendant's conduct to legal consequences. This legal evolution tracked
remarkably well with the positivists' three stages of human thought on
any subject, from the theological through the metaphysical to the final positivist phase.
Holmes did not identify a similar three-stage evolution in the law
of contract. Does this mean that Holmes's theory of contract was not
thoroughly positivist? I think not, for the following interrelated
reasons.
Holmes's contract theory was more of a reactive theory than his
unified tort and criminal law theory. There were good reasons for
this. As we have seen, the contract treatises published before 1880
were much more sophisticated than the treatises on torts.24 5 The best
contract treatises were organized analytically and had coherent, sophisticated theoretical bases. They gave Holmes plenty to react to.
Holmes was also under a degree of deadline pressure for his contract
lectures. The lectures were scheduled for late fall of 1880. Holmes
did not start writing his contract lectures until that summer. Holmes
had to start from scratch for his contract lectures, and time was running out. He had left for last the one topic he had not previously
written on. Not surprisingly, then, Holmes's positivist contribution to
our understanding of the evolution of contract-his devastating attack
on Maine's evolutionary theory-was reactive.
Moreover, there was a real impediment to any positivist description of the evolution of contract law: the history of the common law of
contract did not lend itself easily to positivist redescription. In this,
too, the common law of contract differed from the common law of
tort. The rise of the negligence cause of action in the early nineteenth century, with its metaphysical-sounding standard-the conduct
of the ordinary reasonable man-made the history of tort law peculiarly ripe for a positivist redescription. The early history of contract,
involving the forms of action for debt and assumpsit, is much less
tractable. Most importantly, perhaps, the movement of the law in the
245 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, Contract: The Twitching Corpse, in
HISTORY, supra note 59, at 321, 324-25.
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nineteenth century by judges schooled in the prevailing will theory
might be seen by a thorough-going positivist as a regressive movement
back toward theological modes of thought. So Holmes could have
plausibly believed that his positivist reduction of the law of contract to
morally-neutral laws of antecedence and consequence was, itself, the
most significant event in the evolution of contract law toward a purely
positivist form.
2.

Policy Grounds

Toward the middle of his second lecture on tort law, Holmes explained the public policy justification for the objective standard of tort
liability:
It is [not] for the purpose of improving men's hearts, but ... it is to

give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held
responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting
accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom
of others
24 6
with the protection of the individual from injury.
The objective standard of tort liability perfectly reconciles these
two important public policies. By imposing liability only for harm
caused by conduct that the experience of mankind has shown to be
dangerous, tort law deters only the conduct that we need to deter to
keep people safe; it leaves people free to pursue all other conduct
without the threat of liability. When tort law is fully reduced to a set
of specific rules identifying exclusively the conduct that will lead to
liability should it cause harm, the law will be even more effective in
achieving its dual goals of deterring dangerous conduct while leaving
beneficial conduct, not known to be dangerous, undeterred.
In his contract lectures, on the other hand, Holmes did not elaborate an explicit policy justification for the purely objective liability
standards to which he had reduced the common law of contract. Did
Holmes, then, believe there was no policy justification for his objective
contract standards? That would be inconsistent with his theory that
every judicial decision and judicial rule was ultimately justified by a
policy, that is-the consequences for the community. Further, that
would seem to be a drastic change from his unified tort and criminal
law theory, in which Holmes clearly identified the combination of policies that justified the objective standards of tort liability. It seems
likely, then, that Holmes had a definite policy justification in mind as
he wrote his contract lectures, even though he did not spell it out for
his readers.
246

HoLums, supra note 6, at 115.
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If we read Holmes's lectures looking for a policy justification for
his objective contract standards, we find nothing explicit. But if we
read those lectures carefully, in context, Holmes's policy may reveal
itself by implication.
In discussing the elements of contract, Holmes said in passing,
"Contracts are dealings between men, by which they make arrangements for the future."2 47 It may be helpful to read this comment in
the context of the positivist's basic thesis about knowledge and power.
According to Mill and Comte,
It] he knowledge which mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly
pursued, being that which they most needed, was foreknowledge .... When they sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to
control the effect, or if it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt
their conduct to it. Now, all foresight of phanomena, and power
over them, depend on knowledge of their sequences ....
All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent actions, have only been possible
in proportion as men have successfully attempted to ascertain the
248
succession of phamomena.
If contracts are dealings by which men "make arrangements for
the future," therefore, it is peculiarly important that men learn the
laws of antecedence and consequence embedded in the law of contract. Only then will they be able to predict what conduct will lead the
courts to say there was a valid contract and whatjudicial consequences
will follow if the contractual assurances do not come true. The objective, positivist theory of contract, by reducing contract law to a scientific law of antecedence and consequence, enables one to make
accurate predictions about these practically important matters. It
therefore enables individuals to make more effective arrangements
for the future and to make more rational choices about whether to
enter into a contract and whether to breach a contract. Scientific
knowledge of the laws of antecedence and consequence in the field of
contract, therefore, gives individuals greater power to control and predict the future. This, in turn, may encourage socially beneficial activity, as those who can predict and control the consequences of
contract-producing behavior are more likely to enter into contracts,
and, as Holmes stated in his tort theory lectures, "the public generally
2 49
profits by individual activity."
This policy justification for an objective, positivist law of contract
is peculiarly thin. The policy goals would seem to be equally served by
247
248
249

Id. at 239.
MILL, supra note 18, at 292-94.
HOLMES, supra note 6, at 77.
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the positivist reduction of any substantive law of contract, whatever the

original substantive law. Holmes, however, seemed to derive a general
substantive principle from this policy justification for an objective law
of contract. The principle was this: contract law should be formulated
so as to maximize the contracting individual's ability to control the
legal consequences of the contract. Thus, under Holmes's theory of
voidable contracts, the parties, by express terms, could preclude the
courts from reading in the implied conditions on which the law of
voidable contracts rests. And Holmes's implicitjustification forJustice
Willes's Nettleship rule, which limits special consequential damages in
contract cases to those risks which the defaulting party fairly assumed
when entering the contract, depends on the desirability of giving the
parties themselves effective control over the extent of damages recov2 50
erable in the event of a breach.
250 Holmes's scientific characterization that the immediate consequence of a binding promise-that the promisor took on himself the risk that the assumed event
would not occur-was not a description of the promisor's intentions or his conscious
understanding of the consequences of his promise. Holmes made that clear at the
start of the discussion of consequential damages: "[T] he statement that the effect of a
contract is the assumption of the risk of a future event does not mean that there is a
second subsidiary promise to assume that risk, but that the assumption follows as a
consequence directly enforced by the law, without the promisor's co-operation." Id.
at 237. But if that is true, any legal rule about recoverable consequential damages
would be consistent with Holmes's formal theory that the immediate legal effect of a
binding promise is the assumption of the risk of a future event. The Nettleship position that the extent of recovery for special consequential damages depends on the
assumption of that risk somehow entering into the contract as a matter of fact, see
British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, 3 L.R.-C.P. 499, 509 (1868), is not entailed in Holmes's theoretical claim that every binding promise is an assumption of
the risk of the promised event. Under Holmes's theory, the risks of the event, as well
as the limits of those risks, are defined by reference to the foreseeable judicially-imposed damages in the event of failure of the promised event. How can Holmes, then,
go on to argue that Willes's position in Nettleship "falls in with the true theory of
contract under the common law"? HoLMEs, supra note 6, at 238.
The answer, I think, is this: one can support the Willes test of recoverable consequential damages only by bringing in a principle that is not the same as or deducible
from Holmes's scientific description of the immediate legal effect of a promise as the
assumption of the risk of the promised event. And Holmes in fact brings in that
principle: "As the relation of contractor and contractee is voluntary, the consequences attaching to that relationship must be voluntary." Id at 237. This is not true
as a matter of purely scientific description, and Holmes's seeming suggestion that it is
true, in the immediately following analogy between "what the event contemplated by
the promise is," and "what consequences of the breach are assumed," is unconvincing,
for the very reason that Holmes himself recognized just a paragraph earlier. "[When
people make contracts, they usually contemplate the performance rather than the
breach." Id
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This understanding of the implicit policy justification for
Holmes's objective law of contracts tends to explain a puzzling feature
of Holmes's theory. The puzzle is this: if Holmes's objective theory of
contract formation was a deliberate rejection of the prevailing will theory, why is it that his fully-elaborated theory gave the objectively-announced intentions of the parties more control over the judicial
consequences of a contract than the theory of a committed will theorist like Pollock? The answer points to Holmes's particular historical
situation. The contract law that Holmes set about to reduce to laws of
antecedence and consequence was the nineteenth-century common
law of contract that had, according to our historians, 5 1 adopted new
rules based on the prevailing will theory. Chief among those new
rules were contract formation by offer and acceptance and a reworked, minimized doctrine of consideration more in keeping with
the will theory. Not surprisingly, then, even in its reduced form, the
new nineteenth-century law of contract carried with it its justification
in will theory. That theory, in Holmes's positivist redescription, was
merely translated from a normative principle justifying the rules of
contract law into a social policy achieved by those rules. In the translation, the focus of the will theory was changed from the joint wills of
the contracting parties as the basis for the contractual obligation to a
simple policy of allowing an individual to effectuate his own will. We
may put this a different way: the most plausible policy ground for the
nineteenth-century law of contract, once it was reduced to a positivist
There is a plausible interpretation of all this that supports the conclusion that
Holmes elaborated an internally coherent theory. That interpretation would focus on
what Holmes meant by "the true theory of contract under the common law." That
"true theory" may be, like Holmes's "true explanation" of tort liability, see id at 115, a
theory that focuses on the social policy that the law of contract tends to achieve.
Holmes did not set that policy out explicitly, but his emphasis on the voluntary nature

of contractual relationships and the conclusion of his argument here suggest he had
in mind the following policy ground. The law of contract encourages productive action by making fixed, definite, and certain the consequences of a particular relationship voluntarily entered into to control the future. The purpose of that law is not to
enforce the parties' wills, but to enable individuals to fulfill their personal desires
through adroit use of the contract conventions. If courts determine the extent of
recoverable consequential damages by construction of the parties' intentions, even
when there is no specific intention on this question, contracting parties in the future
will have maximum effective control over the legal consequences of their conduct.
Moreover, the courts will also eliminate a potential deterrent to entering into contracts, in the form of surprising and potentially catastrophic consequential damage
awards not remotely foreseeable by the promisor.
251

See ATwAH, supra note 124, at 399-453; GoP.DLEY, supra note 124, at 161-213;
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law of antecedence and consequences, was the effectuation of autonomous individual choice.
IV.
A.

EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE

The Success of Holmes's Theory of Contract

A thoroughgoing positivist like Mill or Comte would consider
Holmes's theory of contract a considerable success. Holmes entered a
field where the common law had been influenced for over seventy
years by the will theory of contract, a theological theory if ever there
were one. Holmes entered a field already thoroughly discussed by a
number of sophisticated, nonpositivist treatise writers. He nevertheless succeeded in elaborating a wholly positivist theory, reducing all of
the law of contract to scientific laws of antecedence and consequence,
banishing from his descriptive theory both the subjective intentions of
the contracting parties and the moral terminology used to judge the
subjective morality of the parties' conduct. Perhaps the most impressive thing about Holmes's theory was how completely positivist it was
over the whole range of challenging topics that he addressed, including the formation of contract, mutual mistake, fraud, and misrepresentation. Holmes the positivist should have been proud.
But unlike his theory of torts, Holmes's theory of contract did not
become the lens through which subsequent theorists saw this area of
the law. From the start, Holmes was just one of many voices in the
ongoing sophisticated dialogue on the theory of contract. That meant
that Holmes's theory of contract as a whole, positivist package did not
set the subsequent theoretical agenda the way his theory of torts did.
Many parts of Holmes's theory of contract were neither widely accepted nor influential. Subsequent lawyers,judges, and contract theorists largely ignored Holmes's redefinition of mutual mistake as
objectively repugnant terms in the contract, 252 and they largely ignored his redefinition of voidable contracts as constructive condition
cases. 253 Other parts of Holmes's theory, however, immediately en252 Nowhere in his discussion of mutual mistake does the author of the current
authoritative treatise on contract discuss Holmes's theory that mutual mistake cases
are ordinarily just cases of objectively repugnant terms. 2 E. ALAN FARNSWvORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRA=TS § 9.3, at 569-82 (2d ed. 1998).
253 Neither in any of his extensive discussions of voidable contracts nor in his separate, extensive discussions of implied conditions does the author of the current authoritative treatise on contracts mention Holmes's theory that voidable contracts are
really constructive condition cases. 1 id- § 4.4, at 424-27 (minor), § 4.7, at 439-40

(mental incompetence), § 4.15, at 472-76 (misrepresentation), § 4.19, at 490-91 (duress); 2 id at §§ 8.2-.7a, at 392-447 (conditions), §§ 9.3-.4, at 569-95 (mistake).

1752

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:5

tered the ongoing dialogue over the Anglo-American theory of contract. Holmes's explanation of consideration achieved wide
influence, 25 4 and his objective theory of contract formation anchored
one pole of a continuing dialectic between subjective and objective
theories. 255 Similarly, Holmes's amoral, objective theory of contract
breach anchored one pole of a continuing dialectic between moral
and amoral theories. 25 6 Some of Holmes's critical, reactive analysis
seems to have carried the day completely. No one after Holmes tried
to force the Anglo-American history of contract law into Maine's hypothesized evolutionary pattern from formal to consensual contracts.
Almost all that remains of Langdell's method of purified doctrinalism
is Holmes's devastating critique of it.257 And, after Holmes's critique
of his position, Pollock himself publicly renounced his flirtation with
2 58
innocent misrepresentation as grounds for voiding a contract.
If we use subsequent influence as a measure of success, the failure
of Holmes's theory as a whole and the success or partial success of
individual parts of that theory raise some interesting questions. All of
Holmes's contract theory was objective, reductive, and positivist. It
can be seen as a coherent, positivist whole. Why, then, were some
parts of the theory influential and other parts not? What is it about
the influential parts that accounts for their influence? What is it
about the completely successful parts that accounts for their success?
The answer to these last two questions cannot be their positivist character, for equally positivist portions of Holmes's contract theory were
neither successful nor influential. What is it, then?
We can, perhaps, derive a negative condition for success from a
feature that seems to be common to all the unsuccessful parts of
Holmes's theory. In each of these parts, Holmes's reductive analysis
had called for the abolition or total redefinition of an established legal doctrine. Thus, Holmes's analysis of mutual mistake asked his
reader to throw out the category "mutual mistake" altogether and see
these either as cases of mutually repugnant essential terms or inconsistent usage of a single proper noun. Holmes's analysis of voidable contracts asked his reader to throw out the category "voidable contract"
254 See 1 id §§ 2.2-.4, at 73-80.
255 See 1 id § 3.6, at 192-96.
256

CompareRicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-14 (3d ed. 1986)

(championing amoral "efficient breach" theory), with Daniel Friedmann, The Effwient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989).
257 Langdell's most consistent disciples, James Barr Ames, Samuel Williston, and
Joseph Beale, are possible exceptions. Cf Grey, supranote 97, at 32-39 (recognizing
extensive influence of Langdell's "classical orthodoxy").
258 See PouJocK, CoNTrAcrs, 3d ed., supra note 156, at xviii-xix.
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and see these as constructive condition cases. Those who share
Holmes's overriding commitment to reductive, positivist methodology
may accept Holmes's invitation to discard these traditional doctrinal
categories and see just the underlying phenomena and their laws of
antecedence and consequence, but it may be asking too much of
those who do not share that commitment.
The parts of Holmes's contract theory that were successful or influential did not ask his reader to throw out established doctrinal categories. Instead, these parts seemed to present just a different way of
looking at the established doctrine. Holmes's contract theory became
a partial success as a theoretical explanation of existing contract law,
including the existing doctrinal categories, and Holmes's theories
seemed to be most successful where the alternative theories were the
weakest. To appreciate why some of Holmes's theories were successful, then, we must identify both the weaknesses of the theories he was
reacting against and the strength of Holmes's theory in comparison.
It is easy to explain the success of Holmes's critique of the application of Maine's evolutionary theory to the common law of contract.
Maine had analyzed the evolution of ancient Roman contract law. He
generalized from that, simply assuming that the Roman progression
was part of the evolution of all Western contract law, either because
that law began with the developed Roman law of consensual contracts
and therefore incorporated in its history the Roman progression from
formal to informal contract, or because the development of contract
law in any other ancient society would probably follow the evolution
from formal to consensual contract that he saw in ancient Roman law.
Maine argued for a parallel evolution in other ancient societies, not
from any historical facts, but from his assumption that the Roman
evolution was natural and reasonable: "[From the absence ...of everything violent, marvellous, or unintelligible [in the Roman evolution],

. .

.it may be reasonably believed that the history of Ancient

Roman contracts is, up to a certain point, typical of the history of this
class of legal conceptions in other ancient societies." 259
Given Maine's reasoning, his evolutionary theory would apply to
the common law if the common law at some point adopted the developed Roman law of consensual contracts. If the common law did not
adopt the Roman law of consensual contracts, however, the only thing
supporting the conclusion that the common law evolved from formal
to consensual contract is Maine's argument that all legal orders would
naturally progress from formal to consensual contract. But the actual
progression in any particular society would be a matter of fact to be
259
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determined by studying the history of contract law in that society.
When that history is accessible, Maine's evolutionary thesis seems to
be just a speculation about what that history will show. The application of Maine's evolutionary thesis to the common law, which was
based on two alternative assumptions of historical fact, was thus vulnerable to Holmes's argument that neither assumption was correct.
The common law of contract, Holmes argued, did not adopt the developed Roman law of consensual contracts; the early development of
the common law of contract, Holmes argued, does not show an evolution from formal to consensual contract.
Holmes's history was just the thing to stop the attempt by Pollock
and others to apply Maine's evolutionary thesis to the common law.
The ultimate success of Holmes's attack was foreshadowed by the immediate response of Frederick Pollock, an early, ardent follower of
Maine. In the introduction to the third edition of his treatise, Pollock
analyzed in detail Holmes's arguments on the history of the common
law of contract. In conclusion, Pollock confessed that "the effect of
Mr. Holmes's investigation as a whole is to shake one's belief in the
distinction between formal and informal contracts as a material point
260
of archaic or semi-archaic law."
Why was Holmes's objective theory of contract formation at least
partially successful? At first glance, Holmes's theory seems to be an
improvement only over an unsophisticated will theory of contract formation, in which a contract is said to be formed only when the subjective wills of the parties in fact agree. Once a will theorist like
Pollock 261 recognizes that internal subjective states can be conveyed,
or evidenced, only by external actions, that theorist can plausibly accept Holmes's external theory of contract formation, up to a point.
He can say that the external behaviors that Holmes points to as the
basis for a contract are simply the external acts that the courts look to
as evidence of the internal, subjective wills of the parties.
What possible explanatory advantage does Holmes's purely external theory then have over the "objective-evidence-of-an-internal-state"
will theory of contract formation? The answer, I think, is this: in some
ways, Holmes's purely external theory is more consistent with the
common law of contract than the objective-evidence will theory, which
has problems that Holmes's theory does not. Since the will theory
assumes that external conduct of the parties gives rise to an enforceable contract because that conduct indicates a mutual common subjective intention by the parties, it has no satisfactory answer to the
260
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question why the law deems certain external conduct to be sufficient
evidence, and other conduct, which seems equally reliable as proof of
subjective intent, is not deemed sufficient. It is not clear, for instance,
why my offer to pay you ten dollars if you paint my fence next Tuesday
could not be accepted, forming an enforceable contract, by your written statement that you agree to paint my fence next Tuesday for ten
dollars.
Another problem facing the objective-evidence will theory was
suggested by Pollock's problem with the common-law rule about innocent misrepresentation. The objective-evidence will theory has difficulty explaining why an objectively provable unilateral mistake does
not vitiate the contract at common law. The objective-evidence will
theory also has difficulty explaining why objectively provable, mutually
common, subjective intentions do not create an enforceable contract
in the absence of consideration. Holmes, whose purely external theory purports to be purely descriptive, need not answer any of these
questions that bedevil the objective-evidence will theory. Insofar as
the will theory's answers to these questions are unconvincing,
Holmes's cleaner, thinner theory seems more attractive.
Holmes's critique of Langdell's peculiar scientific methodology
was successful because that methodology was inconsistent with the way
common-law judges, then and now, decide cases. Judges do not seek
to discover the true meaning of the legal terms that judges had used
in explaining their prior decisions; 2 62 judges do not, then, decide
cases before them by applying those legal meanings to achieve a purified doctrinal consistency over a range of cases, regardless of the specific claims of justice in an individual case.2 63

Holmes's specific

criticisms of Langdell's discussion of acceptance by mail and of Langdell's analysis of dependent and independent promises were persuasive and successful because Holmes argued for an alternative
approach consistent with the courts' concerns for practical, workable
decisions consistent with justice in the individual case and the parties'
likely intentions under the circumstances. Holmes's general critique
of Langdell's methodology, which he elaborated in his review2 64 of
Langdell's Summary and repeated as a general introduction to The
262 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (meaning of
"inherently dangerous product" exception to privity rule reinterpretted); Scott v.
Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773) (broadly recharacterizing causal relationship

to fit "direct causation" requirement of trespass).
263 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADnoN:
62-92 (1960).
264 See Book Notices, 14 Am. L. REv. 233 (1880).
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Common Law, 2 6 5 was directly on target. Most of us recognize the famous sentence from that critique: "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience." 2 66 Its poetic charm serves as a fitting
epitaph for the methodology it buried so deeply that most lawyers and
judges know of its epitaph.
Although Holmes's critique buried Langdell's peculiar methodology, much of Langdell's substantive analysis lived on in Holmes's contract theory. Comparing Holmes's three lectures on contract with
Langdell's Summary, we can see that Holmes used Langdell extensively. Holmes explicitly used Langdell's analysis as a foil against
which to develop his analyses of acceptance by mail,2 6 7 conditions precedent and subsequent, 268 and dependent and independent
promises. 269 Moreover, there are notable similarities between some of
Langdell's other discussions and Holmes's treatments of the same topics. These similarities suggest that Holmes borrowed, without attribution, Langdell's doctrinal insights that were consistent with Holmes's
positivism. There are at least four of these similarities. First, Langdell
questioned the applicability of Maine's category of consensual contract to common-law contracts whose breach is redressible in assumpsit, for in each case there must be consideration for the contract to be
2 70
enforceable and the consideration is a formal requirement.
Holmes said that consideration was as much a form as the seal. 27 1 Second, Langdell pointed out that acceptance as an independent element of an enforceable contract is not really important in either
unilateral or bilateral contracts, for those contracts are not enforceable until the consideration called for by the offer is provided, and
providing the consideration in and of itself supplies sufficient evidence of acceptance. 272 Holmes left out acceptance as an essential
element of contract because giving consideration evidenced acceptance and acceptance without consideration did not make a contract.
Third, Langdell relegated the will theory of contract formation to a
legal fiction and insisted that the contract was made not by the subjective wills of the parties but by their physical acts. 273 Holmes insisted
that contracts were made by the overt acts of the parties, not their
265
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subjective intent. Fourth, in his discussion of consideration, Langdell
argued that detriment to the promisee was sufficient, even without a
benefit to the promisor.2 74 He argued that the consideration must be
the inducement for the promise only in contemplation of law275 and
need not be the inducement in fact, and he argued that the initial
offer conclusively designates the called-for consideration. 276 Holmes
defined consideration as what is designated by the parties as the conventional inducement for the promise. Altogether, these similarities
suggest that Holmes may have borrowed heavily from Langdell on
these four issues.
Holmes's theory of consideration, which he seems to have borrowed in large part from Langdell, was probably the most successful of
Holmes's contract theories in terms of acceptance and influence.
Holmes's theory of consideration seems to have had an impact almost
immediately. Holmes's analysis of consideration probably influenced
Pollock to put a similar definition of consideration into the third edition of his contract treatise, published in 1881.277 And the bargained-

for exchange theory traceable ultimately to Holmes seems to be the
274 See id. at 82.
275 See id- at 77-79.
276 See idat 83.
277 In his third edition, Pollock added the following two sentences at the end of a
revised first paragraph in his chapter on consideration:
An act or forbearance of the one party, present or promised, in [sic] the
price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus
given for value is enforceable. An informal and gratuitous promise, however
strong may be the motives or even the moral duty on which it is founded, is
not enforced by English courts ofjustice.
POLLOCK, CONTRACrS, 3d ed., supra note 156, at 179.
This formula is remarkably similar to Holmes's bargain theory of consideration,
shorn of Holmes's notion that whether something is given in exchange for the promise is to be determined solely from the language of the contract itself. The only place
where this bargained-for exchange idea was discussed in Pollock's first edition was in
Pollock's discussion of adequacy of consideration. See POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 155.
By bringing this into the first paragraph of the chapter on consideration in the third
edition and adding a sentence about the unenforceability of gratuitous informal
promises, Pollock elevated the idea from one of subsidiary importance in the explanation of a minor subtopic to one of the greatest importance in the very definition of
consideration.
Pollock's third edition was published after Pollock had read Holmes's book. Pollock wrote in the introduction to the third edition that
my own chapters on Form of Contract and Consideration were already revised and in type when I read Mr. Holmes's on the history and elements of
contract. Being unable, therefore, to take account of his results, otherwise
than by a few notes added as an afterthought, I will say a word of them here.
Id. at xi.
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regnant theoretical explanation of consideration today.2 78 What accounts for the success of Holmes's theory of consideration? In the
eighteenth century, "consideration" was the good reason for the
promisor's promise that was the basis for the moral obligation to fulfill that promise. 279 Our historians of the common law of contract all
agree that, in the nineteenth century, the requirement of consideration to support an enforceable contract was successively emptied of its
eighteenth-century significance as the very basis for the contractual
obligation. 280 In the nineteenth century, consideration became a vestigial form as the law was reformulated to recognize a new basis for
the contractual obligation-the mutually concurring wills of the contracting parties. The role of consideration was therefore reduced, but
it still remained as a requirement. The requirement was easily met,
however, because the courts refused to examine independently the
adequacy of the consideration and presumed that any consideration
that was accepted in exchange for the promisor's promise was
adequate.
Consideration thus posed a serious problem for contract theorists
toward the end of the nineteenth century. The logic of the will theory
seemed to support the abolition of consideration as an element of
contractual liability altogether, yet the courts, even after reformulating contract law to adopt the will theory's offer and acceptance as
elements, still retained consideration as an element. The theorists
before Langdell and Holmes flailed around. Stephen Leake said consideration was evidence of the seriousness of the promise; 281 William
Were the two sentences Pollock added to the first paragraph of the consideration
chapter part of those "few notes added as an afterthought"? There is good reason to
believe they were. Once something was in type in the days before computers, the
easiest place to add something was at the very beginning or at the very end, without
footnotes. Significantly, there are no changes in Pollock's chapter on consideration
at the end, and these two added sentences at the beginning were not footnoted.
Moreover, there is an uncharacteristic typographical error in the first added sentence.
The sentence read "an act or forebearance . . . in the price," when Pollock really
meant "an act or forebearance ... is the price." This error, corrected in later editions, suggests a late, hurried addition after the book was in type. Finally, Pollock did
not exactly adopt Holmes's objectively-determined bargain theory of consideration.
He just brought up from his discussion of adequacy of consideration an idea that he
now, perhaps as an "afterthought," saw was crucial to understanding consideration in
general.
278 See, e.g., 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 252, § 2, at 61.
279 See ATnYAH, supra note 124, at 139-54.
280 See id at 448-54; GoRDLEY, supra note 124, at 165-75.
281 See STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRAcTS 10
(London, Stevens & Sons 1867).
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Markby dismissed consideration as simply a form; 282 and Pollock retreated into a fog of disjointed discussions of particular applications of
28 3
the consideration requirement.
Holmes's refinement of Langdell's insight was the right explanation at the right time. Holmes's explanation of consideration appeared to be simply descriptive. It avoided the problem of giving an
adequate rationale for the consideration requirement by simply not
asking the question in the first place. Moreover, as descriptive theory
it seemed to save the cases where any will-theory explanation of consideration could not. Consideration, as any detriment to the promisee that was designated by the parties in the contract as consideration
for the promise, seemed to cover the nineteenth-century cases perfectly, including the troublesome unknown reward cases and past-executed consideration cases. This descriptive power was enhanced by
Holmes's use of the facts in Coggs v. Bernard28 4 as his principal example, cut loose from the opinion in Coggs itself. This allowed Holmes to
reinterpret as a simple application of his theory a troublesome precedent, 285 which had seemed to allow for enforcement of gratuitous
promises without consideration. Finally, Holmes's theory of consideration would appeal to the will theorists themselves, for the ultimate
consequences of Holmes's theory, although not the theory itself,
seemed consistent with the will theory of contract. That is because
Holmes's theory allows the parties themselves to mutually designate,
in the contract itself, what is to count as consideration. A committed
will theorist like Pollock, then, could easily adopt a version of
Holmes's bargained-for exchange theory without accepting Holmes's
286
positivist twist.
We can detect a common pattern running through each of the
cases where a part of Holmes's theory became influential. Holmes's
analysis was in some way more consistent with the law-the facts to be
explained or more deeply understood by theory-than the competing
theories. In each of these cases, readers could accept Holmes's theory
over the competing theory, not because it was positivist, but because it
28 7
was more consistent with the facts forming the basis for any theory.
282

See WILLIAM

MAPEBY, ELEMENTs OF LAW CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO PRINCI-

310 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1885).
283 See POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 147-65.
284 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (KB. 1704).
285 See ATwAH, supra note 124, at 186-89.
286 See supra note 277.
287 The only possible exception to this pattern is Holmes's theory of efficient
breach, the logical corollary of his notion that "the immediate legal effect of what the
promisor does" in a contract is to "take the risk of the event, within certain defined
PLES OF GENERALJURISPRUDENCE
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Weaknesses in Holmes's Theory of Contract

Methodological Critique of Holmes's Theory

The first methodological problem with Holmes's theory of contract is a problem for all social science theories that simply look for
what is common to each component of a field comprised of social
phenomena.2 88 The problem is this: you can apply the least-commondenominator methodology only to a select set of social phenomena.
But there is no basis in that methodology to justify the choice of one
set over another. The resulting theory will be skewed by the pre-theoretical choice of a field within which to search for commonalities. So,
here, Holmes's theory is skewed by the pre-theoretical acceptance of
the field of "assumpsit-based contract" within which to conduct his
reductive scientific analysis. The acceptance of -contract as the field
for theorizing is not supported by any theoretical analysis. It may well
be that the broader fields of all civil liability or all tort and contract
liability, or the narrower fields of bilateral contracts or unilateral contracts are more appropriate fields for theorizing. Ironically, Holmes
himself in his lecture on the history of contract gave a tort rationale
for early contractual liability in assumpsit, 2 89 a rationale that could
plausibly have been extended to support a unified theory of tort and
contract liability. And later on, in his letters to Pollock, Holmes com290
pared committing a tort to committing a contract.
If we look at The Common Law as a whole, we can, perhaps, see
why Holmes treated contract as a distinct field for theorizing separate
and apart from the field of tort. Holmes organized his discussion in
The Common Law by using the categories he had developed in his early
foray into analytical jurisprudence. Thus, torts are treated separately
from contracts because tort law deals with duties of all to all, while
limits, as between himself and the promisee." HOLMES, supra note 6 at 235. This
notion was specifically criticized by both Anson and Pollock immediately after publication of The Common Law. See WrLiuAm R. ANSON, PRINCPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
CoNTRArc 8-10 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1882); PoLLocK, CONTRACTS, 3d ed.,
supra note 156, at xix-xx. The efficient breach idea gained a toehold in contract

theory only after Holmes's consequences-based, public policy approach to the law
itself gained a stronger following.
288 For a lucid critique of this methodology, see FXNNIs, supra note 1, at 4-6.

289
290

See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 219-20.
See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 12, 1911), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LE=rERS, supra note 120, at 177; Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to
Frederick Pollock (May 30, 1927) in 2 HoLME-PouLocK LrERS 199, 200 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1944); Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec.
11, 1928) in 2 HoLMEs-PoLLoCK LETrERS, supra,at 233. Holmes used this comparison
as well in The Path of the Law, supra note 25, at 485.
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contract law deals with duties of parties to others in special relationships with them.2 9 1 This, however, seems inadequate. The identification of an analytical category does not itself justify the decision to
search for a theory only within that category.
Some further justification is needed. Perhaps the reason Holmes
gave at the beginning of his torts lectures for excluding civil liability
for breach of contract from the relevant field for theorizing may also
serve to justify excluding tort liability from the relevant field for theorizing here. In the torts lecture, Holmes excluded civil liability for
breach of contract from the relevant field by pointing out that liability
for breach of contract depends on the prior consent of the breaching
party to pay the damages caused by his breach, while there is no such
prior consent to tort liability.2 92 This attempted distinction, however,

is unpersuasive. For one thing, Holmes's developed theory of contract vigorously excluded all references to subjective consent of the
parties. Moreover, unless there is a liquidated damages clause, a contract contains no express consent to pay damages for breach of the
promised performance. In most cases, then, the prior consent to
which Holmes refers must be inferred from two things. First, the defendant made a legally binding promise-he assured the plaintiff that
certain events would occur. Second, courts order parties who make
legally binding promises to pay for the damages caused by failure of
the assured event. If this is the basis for inferring prior consent to pay
damages for breach of contract, however, prior consent can be inferred in all tort cases as well. We could say, for example, that we can
infer that one who keeps a wild animal consents to pay for all damages
caused by the creature because he kept a wild animal and because

291 See HoLMES, supra note 6, at 63, 227. This survival of Holmes's earlier work in
analytical jurisprudence in the formal organization of The Common Law caused an
internal inconsistency. The basis for Holmes's classification of the law was different
kinds of duties. By the time Holmes wrote The Common Law, however, he was well on
his way to his subsequent position, in The Path of the Law, that "legal duty" .was an
analytically empty metaphysical notion reducible to "a prediction that if a man does
or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way byjudgment of the
court." Holmes, The Pathof the Law, supranote 25, at 458. In fact, we have seen here
that in his lectures on contract, the last-written lecture, Holmes dispensed with the
notion of legal duty altogether, and simply identified in the field of contract the law
of antecedence and consequence that would enable one to predict courts' decisions
in contract cases.
292 See HoMEs, supra note 6, at 63.
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courts order keepers of wild animals to pay for all damages they
293
cause.
Holmes's contract theory suffers from a second methodological
problem. Holmes's attempt to reduce the law of contract to a scientific law of antecedence and consequence required that he redescribe
the contract-forming elements of promise and consideration as observable phenomena. He achieved this by focusing on the observable
physical conduct of the contracting parties. A promise is the accepted
assurance that a future event will happen; considerationis what is identified by the terms of the agreement as that which is given and accepted as the inducement for the promise. The subjective motives
and the subjective intentions of the parties are banished from
Holmes's theory. As Holmes said at the end of his elements lecture,
"[T] he making of a contract does not depend on the state of the par29 4
ties' minds, it depends on their overt acts."
But the "overt acts" that are the observable phenomena on which
the making of a contract depends are communicative acts-written or
oral statements by the contracting parties. And the relevant content
of the communication, on Holmes's own theory, is what it says about
the party's subjective intentions or subjective motives. The promisor
intends, by his conduct, to "assure" another that a future event will
occur, and the parties, by the terms of the agreement, identify something as the thing that has "induced" the promisor to make his promise. Holmes may not, then, have formulated a purely phenomenal
theory completely divorced from the subjective states of the parties.
He may have just distanced his theory from those subjective states by
one step. Ultimately, those subjective states may still be controlling, as
the overt acts will be effective to form a contract, under Holmes's own
theory, only insofar as they adequately establish a particular intention
on the part of each of the parties to the alleged contract. Holmes's
purely objective theory thus seems to be just a confused form of the
"objective-evidence-of-internal-states" will theory of contract formation. In our day, Holmes's theory has been attacked by Patrick Atiyah,
295
the leading English contract theorist, on precisely this ground.
However, this apparent problem with Holmes's theory is not an
internal inconsistency. Holmes clearly set out to reduce the elements
of contract to observable phenomena; he clearly believed that he had
293 A similar argument seems behind Holmes's later letters to Pollock comparing
committing a tort with committing a contract. See supranote 290 and accompanying
text.
294

HOLMES, supra note 6, at 240.

295 See P.S. ATIYAH, Holmes and the Theory of Contract, in EssAYs
66-67 (1988).
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reduced promise and consideration to purely phenomenal elements.
The question is whether the reduction works when the phenomena
are human communication and human discourse. Holmes did not
address or answer that question in The Common Law. What he needed
was an objective, positivist theory of human communication, or at
least an objective, positivist theory of interpretation. Holmes came
close to presenting such a theory in his analysis of the process of reading conditions into a contract by construction and in his critique of
Langdell's theory of dependent and independent promises. 2 96 But
the theory of interpretation he seemed to be using was not explicitly
stated. 29 7 Moreover, he did not reference this inchoate theory where
it was needed most, as an explanation of how one can look on the
contracting parties' communications as purely objective
2 98
phenomena.
The third methodological problem is a flaw in Holmes's implied
positivist argument in favor of treating voidable contract cases as implied condition cases. The problem is with where you start. Holmes
started with conditions and formulated a general reductive definition
of conditions. He then established that voidable contracts can be reduced to the same definition. But once you have reduced conditional
contracts and voidable contracts to the same thing, there is no reason
to say thereafter that this is the definition of a condition. If you had
started with voidable contracts, you could equally well have said that
this was a reductive definition of voidable contracts, and that conditional contracts are really just voidable contracts. The sensible thing
to do in this circumstance is to use a neutral term-say, "muffin"-to
designate the general category that includes the sub-categories of
"conditions" and "events authorizing voidability of a contract." And if
we were talking about muffins rather than conditions, it would not be
obvious that the muffin should be directed in some way to the manifest grounds for making the contract or should in all events be within
the control of the parties by explicit contractual provisions. Those
predicates might apply only to the muffins that belong to the subcategory of conditions.
296 See HoLMES, supra note 6, at 254-58, 261-64.
297 For an attempt to elaborate that inchoate theory, see supra text following note
237.
298 Faced with a barrage of cases involving questions of interpretation as a judge
on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Holmes developed a more explicit objective theory of interpretation, which he reported in an 1899 article in the Harvard
Law Review. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV.L.
REv. 417 (1899), reprintedin HoLMEs, COLLExTED LEGAL PAPERs, supra note 25, at 203.
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This can be put another way. Holmes's definition of a condition
is not itself a scientific law of antecedence and consequence. It is,
instead, a general form of a set of laws of antecedence and consequence. Each member of that set could have a completely different
policy justification, and each different member will almost always have
at least a slightly different policy justification, since the consequences
of different things are rarely the same. It would not be surprising,
therefore, if the members of the subset "conditions" would have, in
general, different policy grounds than the members of the subset
"events authorizing voidability."
There are methodological problems with both parts of Holmes's
attempt to reduce the law of mutual mistake to objective form.
Holmes explained the Raffles case in purely conduct-based terms, as a
case where the parties said different things. This seems problematic.
When one party said "Peerless" he meant the ship by that name that
sailed in October, and when the other party said "Peerless" he meant
the ship by that name that sailed in December. The case therefore
seems to be about parties who said the same thing but subjectively
intended to refer to different things by that same proper name.
Holmes's argument for his position is not persuasive. He based
that argument on the language convention that any formal use of a
proper name is univocal. We may agree that that is our language convention. Under that convention, when one uses a proper name, it is
like pointing to a single thing with that name. But a proper noun is
part of our language, so use of a proper noun is not exactly the same
thing as a physical gesture. When there is more than one thing with
the same name, and the context does not indicate which of the things
is referred to, the language convention leads to an ambiguity, which
cannot be resolved by reference either to the convention or to the
external physical acts of the speaker. Which one he meant depends
on which one he intended to designate. That intended meaning,
however, may not be determinable from observing the party's external
conduct. That was, after all, the problem in the Raffles case. Because
each party used the same proper name, the other party could not tell
from his conduct that he intended to point to a different ship.
Holmes's position that each party said a different thing, therefore,
necessarily extends the notion of external, observable conduct to include, for speech acts, the intended meaning of the words used.299
In the second part of his treatment of mutual mistake, Holmes
says that the mutual mistake cases that do not involve a Raffles-type
299 Here, again, to support this reductive claim, Holmes needed what was missing
from The Common Law: an objective, positivist theory of interpretation.
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problem are really cases of repugnant fundamental terms. But his
analysis of repugnant terms has both an analytical and a theoretical
problem. The analytical problem is this: in every case in which
Holmes's repugnancy analysis applies, there will either be fraud or
mutual mistake. So, in those cases in which essential terms are repugnant but there is no fraud, the repugnant terms will have been included only because the parties were mutually mistaken about an
essential fact. Once fraud is ruled out, repugnancy simply proves mutual mistake. Repugnancy and mutual mistake are, then, just two alternative ways of describing exactly the same set of facts.
Which of the two descriptions is better? That would seem to depend on the reason the courts would provide a remedy in these cases.
Is the remedy provided because essential terms are repugnant or because the parties are mutually mistaken about an essential fact? The
answer to that question becomes significant only when the parties are
mutually mistaken about an essential fact, but that mistake is not embodied in any term of the contract. Holmes's external repugnancy
test would seem to support recognition of a contract in that case because there are no repugnant terms. The law, both then and now,
seems to be different 3 0°0 Holmes thus faced a problem: his purportedly descriptive theory seemed inconsistent with the cases.
Holmes faced this problem directly. In some cases, Holmes said,
a representation of fact left out of the contract may appropriately be
read into the contract by construction.8 0 ' An example of this is a contract insuring a designated building against fire, based on statements
about its usage included in the insurance application but not included
in the contract. Except for cases like that, Holmes said, a mistake
about an essential fact, based on a representation by the other party,
should not make the contract void:
Where parties having power to bind themselves do acts and.., use
words which are fit to create an obligation, I take it that an obligation arises. If there is a mistake as to a fact not mentioned in the
contract, it goes only to the motives for making the contract. But a
contract is not prevented from being made by the mere fact3 0that
2
one party would not have made it if he had known the truth.
This defense essentially changed the subject, for Holmes here is
talking about unilateral mistake, where the common-law rules are different from the common-law rules for mutual mistake of fact. Perhaps
he could make his theory consistent with the cases by claiming that
300 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 252, § 9.3, at 569-82.
301 See HoLmEs, supra note 6, at 245.
302 Id. at 246.
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every time a court would find that a fact not included in the contract
was essential to the contract, Holmes would conclude that a court
should include it by construction as an implied term of the contract to
which Holmes would apply his repugnancy test. The problem is that,
to determine whether a fact is essential, the courts have looked
outside the bare language of the contract itself to its factual context
and to the ultimate purposes of the parties. 30 3 To focus on the ultimate purposes of the parties, however, Holmes might have to abandon his claim to a purely objective theory based solely on the conduct
304
of the parties.
We have seen that Holmes was driven to apply his repugnancy
theory to breach of warranty cases by the logic of his reductive methodology. By reducing mutual mistake to repugnant essential terms in
the contract, Holmes shifted the focus from the reason for inclusion
of a mistaken essential term to the simple fact that a mistaken essential term was included. Mutual mistake cases are then indistinguishable from breach of warranty cases because those cases, too, involve a
mistaken essential term.
Once you put back in what Holmes's reductive theory leaves out,
however, the differences between the legal consequences of mutual
mistake of fact and breach of warranty become understandable. What
is important is precisely how those terms (or implied terms) got into
the contract. If both parties simply assumed, mistakenly, that a crucially important fact essential to the bargain was true, the courts will
say they have failed to make a contract. If, on the other hand, one
party represented to the other that an essential fact is true, and that
party relied on the representation in entering the contract, that reliance leads the court to give the relying party the choice whether to
proceed with the contractual exchange, once the relied-on representation turns out to be false, or generally, where rescission is not an
eligible remedy, to treat a failure of the relied-on representation like a
breach of a contractual promise. The logic of Holmes's reductive theory, however, forced him away from any kind of explanation based on
the source of the mistaken term. Reductive logic thus led Holmes
again to a position on a matter of contract law, pre-eminently law
about interaction and cooperation between parties, that in important
respects ignored the particular interactions between the parties.

303 Cf id at 245-46. This, too, seems relevant to Holmes's inchoate theory of
interpretation.

304 Here, too, however, a thoroughly objective, positivist theory of interpretation,
which seems to be missing in The Common Law, might save Holmes's theory.
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Substantive Critique of Holmes's Theory

The substantive problems with Holmes's theory of contract are all
directly traceable to his commitments to positivist assumptions. Because of those assumptions, Holmes banished from his theory everything but observable phenomena and scientific laws of antecedence
and consequence. Because of those assumptions, he excluded from
the set of possible justifications for judicial decisions everything but
the ultimate consequences for society.
Holmes presented this as a descriptive theory of the law of contract. As Finnis would point out, however, "the law of contract" refers
in one way or another to a set of human actions, institutions, experiences, and patterns of discourse, which are already illuminated by the
self-understanding of those concerned to act utilizing either our society's contracting conventions or our society's institutional arrangements for remedying or preventing breaches of contract.3 0 5 Holmes
excluded those understandings from his theory and took the external
point of view, utilizing a seemingly scientific least-common-denominator methodology. In doing so, however, Holmes systematically ignored the judgments about centrality, significance, or paradigm status
that anyone concerned to act within our contracting conventions and
remedial institutions would automatically make. 0 6 Similarly, Holmes
excluded from his descriptive explanations any human purposes that
would invoke what he considered unreal theological or metaphysical
entities, such as justice between the parties, justifiable reliance on another's honoring his promise, and wrongful breach of a promise. By
excluding so much of the reality we look to a descriptive theory to
illuminate, Holmes wound up with a theory so divorced from the manifold of human experiences that it purports to explain that it does not
seem to be about human experiences at all.
Pollock was the first of many30 7 to point out this problem in
Holmes's theory. In the introduction to the third edition of his treatise, Pollock criticized Holmes for taking theory to such an extreme
that it loses touch with common understanding:
Mr. Holmes, going farther in the same line of thought, endeavors to
reduce the essence of contractual promises in general to the taking
of a risk, a view which he prefers to the current one that the essence
of obligation is the partial subjection of one free agent's will to an305
306

See FinNwIs, supra note 1, at 3-4.
See id. at 298-308; Govert Den Hartogh, A Conventionalist Theory of Obligation,
17 LAw & PHIL. 351 (1998).
307 See, e.g., Wuiiuv ANSON, PRINcipLEs OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF ComRACr 10 (Ox-

ford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1882).
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other's. As a dialectical exercise there is nothing to be said against
this; but it is something too remote, as indeed Mr. Holmes half admits, from the substance of men's affairs. A man who bespeaks a
coat of his tailor will scarcely be persuaded that he is only betting
with the tailor that such a coat will not be made and delivered to
him within a certain time. What he wants and means to have is the
coat, not an insurance against not having a coat. Nor is Mr.
Holmes's ingenious way of putting the matter seriously aided by the
fact that after all the law cannot make people perform their contracts. In the last resort, it is true, the law cannot make them do
that or anything whatever; it can only punish them if they fail or
disobey. But the conduct of life, even in the most strictly legal point
of view, is something else than a perpetual wager with the State, with
08
liberty and civil rights for the stake.3
The problem is not limited to that part of Holmes's theory that
Pollock so eloquently criticized. Over the whole range of Holmes's
theory, his reductive methodology led him to positions radically at
odds with the pre-theoretical understanding of one concerned to act
within our institutions of contract. The problem undermines
Holmes's explanations of the formation of contracts, the consequences of a contract, and the legal limitations on the enforcement of
seemingly valid contracts.
Using his least-common-denominator methodology, Holmes determined that a contractual promise is just an accepted assurance that
an event will happen, and not a promise to do something. A practically-reasonable person concerned to act within our contracting conventions, however, would say that this kind of a promise is a
308 PoLLocK, CONTRACS, 3d ed., supranote 156, at xix. In the introduction to his
second edition of his treatise, Anson repeated Pollock's argument, changing the coat
in Pollock's example to boots:
Nor again do the parties to a contract contemplate, as anything but a
remote feature in the promise, the liability to pay damages in the event of
breach. If I order a pair of boots to be delivered this day week and paid for
on the ordinary terms of credit, I expect the boots and the bootmaker expects the price. The transaction, according to Mr. Holmes, must be taken to
present itself to the parties in the following light. I bet that the boots will
not be delivered, but that if delivered they will be paid for; the bootmaker
bets that they will be delivered, but that I shall either not accept them or not
pay for them; the stakes are, on his side, damages for non-delivery, on mine,
the price plus the costs of an action in the county court.
It is well to fix our minds on the legal consequences of conduct and
thus to escape so far as may be from confusing law with ethical speculation;
but we cannot afford to disregard altogether the aspect in which men view
the transactions with which they have to do.
ANSON,

supra note 306, at 10.
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peripheral, unusual case. The central case of a contractual promise,3 0 9 he would say, the case that most clearly defines what we mean
by a contractual promise, is the promisor's commitment to do something that the promisee has in some way paid him to do. Under our
contracting conventions, this commitment is one that the promisee
may legitimately rely on, so the promisor should know that the promisee will in fact rely on the promisor's commitment.
Holmes's reductive methodology led him to characterize the
practical consequences of a contract in terms of a scientific law of
antecedence and consequence. If the assured event does not occur,
the courts will order the promisor to pay the promisee a sum of
money. All that the promisee can foresee, scientifically, from the formation of the contract, therefore, is that either the assured event will
happen or the promisor will be ordered to pay the promisee a certain
sum of money. This reductive, amoral description of the practical
consequences of a contract differs in important ways from the ordinary understanding of one concerned to act within the society's contracting conventions. Returning again to the focal or central case of a
contractual promise, one would say that the practical consequence of
a contract is that the promisee has a legitimate moral claim that the
promisor fulfill his commitment by doing what he promised to do.
The moral claim arises in this way: under the contracting conventions,
the promisor's voluntary conduct has led the promisee to believe he
has made a serious promise upon which the promisee is entitled to
rely. The promisor, therefore, should know that the promisee will in
fact rely on it. If the promisor fails to fulfill his contractual commitment-if he fails to do what, in fact, he promised to do in fact-he
has wronged the promisee. The promisee may then sue for this
wrongful breach of the contract. If the contract and the breach are
proven, the court may order the breaching promisor to pay damages
to redress the wrong his breach has done the promisee. It is clear
from our understanding of this focal case, however, that the contracting promisee relies on the promisor's performance, not the
court's remedy in case the promisor wrongfully fails to perform. This
understanding of the practical consequences of a contract is embodied in the ordinary meaning of the traditional, morally-charged language of contract-"promise," "performance," and "breach."
Holmes, of course, redefined "promise" in morally neutral terms and
thereafter banished "performance" and "breach" from his reductive
theory altogether.
309 John Finnis makes the case for using this focal or central case methodology in
FnqNIs, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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Holmes's theory of voidable contracts is at odds with the ordinary
understanding that contracts are voidable when one party has induced the other party to enter a contract by conduct, such as fraud,
coercion, or undue influence, that violates the moral limits we as a
society place on the use of the contracting conventions. In our ordinary understanding, it would make no sense to say that the parties
could explicitly provide that fraud would not make the contract voidable.3 1 0 Extending Holmes's theory to cases of contracts voidable for

duress or undue influence leads to equally incongruous assertions
that the parties could agree that coercion or undue influence leading
to the contract would not result in voidability. None of these hypothetical cases could ever arise, however. No one who understood the
provision would agree that it was all right with her if the other party
had defrauded her, so any provision like that in a contract induced by
fraud would be voidable for fraud as well. The coercion or undue
influence inducing one to enter a contract would also likely induce
one to agree that coercion or undue influence would not affect its
enforceability. So there will never be a test case to prove Holmes right
or wrong on this. Who is to say, therefore, that Holmes is wrong?
It all depends on your method. Holmes's explanation of
voidability for fraud as a constructive condition is plausible unless one
takes the internal point of view of a practically reasonable person concerned to act within our legal institutions.3 1' From that point of view,
the answer seems clear. The rules that a contract is voidable for fraud
in the inducement, coercion, or undue influence are not based on
some plausible construction of the parties' agreement, but on the
moral limits we as a society set to the use of the contract conventions.
From that standpoint, the question of why judges allow a defrauded,
coerced, or unduly influenced party to avoid the resulting contract
has a simple, clear answer: to prevent one from wrongfully using the
contract conventions to benefit himself and injure another.
By focusing here just on fraud in the context of contract law, as a
basis for holding a contract voidable, Holmes stacks the deck in favor
of his conclusion that no-fraud is a distinctly contractual expectation.
But fraud is the basis for a tort action and a ground for a restitution or
310 Pollock criticized Holmes's position on this issue: "I cannot see my way to admitting as a proposition of law that contracting parties are free to condone deliberate
fraud beforehand. Certainly a conventional term ne dolus praestesturwould not have
been good in Roman law." POLLOCK, CoNTRACrS, 3d ed., supranote 156, at xviii (citing "Celsus, quoted and approved by Ulpian D. 50.17 de reg. ivris, 23").
311 John Finnis makes the case for adopting the standpoint of a practically reasonable person concerned to act within a particular social institution. See FINNIS, supra
note 1, at 11-18.
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quasi-contract action as well. This suggests that people's expectations
that others will not defraud them are not distinctively contractual but
are based on a broader social convention that forbids injurious fraud
in relations between members of the community. The different judicial remedies for fraud in tort, contract, and quasi-contract actions are
all based on that central social convention which members of a society
rely on in dealing with others in all sorts of transactions. Here again,
Holmes seems to turn an initial choice of limited subject matter into a
theoretical argument, without theoretical justification for the initial
choice.
There is a final, deep inconsistency between Holmes's theory of
contract and our ordinary understanding of contracting conventions
and the law relating to them. As we suggested above, 312 under
Holmes's theory the most plausible policy justification for the law of
contract is that it encourages socially desirable action by individuals by
making clear to them the legal consequences of certain contract-making or contract-breaching conduct. The justification looks to the actions of the individual contracting party, not to the coordinated
actions of the contracting parties. This seems to be an extraordinarily
solipsistic explanation of contract law, which is, after all, about specific
agreements, one of the ways that we have found to reliably coordinate
our conduct with the conduct of others to our mutual advantage.
Also, it leads to an extraordinarily legalistic law of contract. Under
Holmes's theory, the purpose of contract law is neither to redress private wrongs nor to encourage good faith and fair dealing between
contracting parties. It is, on the contrary, to ensure reliable, predictable legal consequences of particular actions-both contract-making
and contract-breaching actions. The premium in Holmes's theory is
therefore on consistent, predictable application of legal rules formulated in purely phenomenal terms without reference to traditional
moral judgments. On this view, contracting seems to be a zero-sum
game that you can win if you know the legal rules better than your
contracting adversary.3 13
CONCLUSION

Brilliantly, Holmes overcame the multiple challenges facing him
as he wrote his three lectures on contract. He turned to his advantage
the sophisticated contemporary contract treatises by Pollock and
312 See supra Part III.D.2.
313 Holmes himself later characterized contracting parties as "adversaries." See
Holmes, supra note 298, at 419, reprinted in HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 25, at 203, 206.
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Langdell. Pollock's careful, subtle application to the common law of
Savigny's will theory of contract provided a solid target to shoot at to
undermine the prevailing will theory. Langdell's brilliant analysis of
individual contract doctrines provided him, alternatively, with foils
against which he could develop more thoroughly positivist theories
and with seemingly already-vetted, objective descriptions of doctrine
that Holmes, with just a slight twist, could plug into his positivist
analysis.
Also, Holmes succeeded in elaborating a thoroughly positivist descriptive theory of contract, a field where the theological will theory
had influenced the development of the common law for over half a
century. Holmes used his lecture on the history of contract to undermine the historical theory that seemed to buttress the will theory of
contract: Maine's theory that contract law evolved from formal, objective contracts to informal, consensual contracts. Holmes used his lecture on the elements of contract to reduce the basic law of contract to
a scientific law of antecedence and consequence. Also, Holmes used
his lecture on void and voidable contracts to reduce those seemingly
intractable morality-based rules to laws of antecedence and
consequence.
Although Holmes's theory of contract on its own terms as a fully
positivist theory must be deemed an unqualified success, the theory
has had less influence than Holmes's theory of torts, which set the
parameters for all subsequent American tort theories. Holmes's contract theory entered an ongoing sophisticated dialogue over contract
theory, and only bits and pieces of his theory were widely accepted: his
attack on the application of Maine's evolutionary theory to the common law of contract and his objective bargained-for exchange theory
of consideration. Other parts of Holmes's theory anchor one pole in
a continuing dialogue: his purely objective theory of contract formation and his objective analysis of the consequences of breach, leading
to the conclusion that there is no "duty" to perform a contractual
promise, and its correlative theory of efficient breach. Some parts of
Holmes's theory have had little or no influence: his theory that contracts are voidable because of a constructive condition read into the
initial agreement and his explanation of mutual mistake cases as cases
of mutually repugnant fundamental terms or inconsistent usage of a
single proper noun. In general, the parts of Holmes's theory that
were not influential were those that required the reader to throw out
an established legal doctrine or legal category in order to accept a
reductive replacement. In general, those parts of Holmes's theory
that were wholly successful were better as descriptive theory than corn-
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peting theoretical explanations because they better fit the
phenomena.
The ultimate problem with Holmes's contract theory as a whole is
its positivist character. Holmes rigorously excluded all "theological"
and "metaphysical" notions from his theory. So there is nothing in
Holmes's theory about one's duty to fulfill one's contractual obligation, or about justifiable reliance on another's fulfilling his contractual promise, or about wrongful breach of contract. For Holmes, all
these things are unreal, or at least unknowable. The positivist scientist
dealing with what we can know must therefore exclude all reference
to those notions from his scientific descriptive theories. He must stick
to what we can know-phenomena and the laws of antecedence and
consequence. But we cannot be scientists in the way that Holmes
thought we could. We cannot simply observe from the outside the
phenomena of human action, human cooperation, and human discord.3 1 4 We have inside information because we are human beings.
We participate in human institutions, human cooperative action, and
human discord. Based on those experiences, we know the reality of
contractual obligations, justifiable expectations based on contractual
promises, and wrongful breach. We also know, then, that Holmes's
theory explains a different world than the one in which we live.

314

See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 3-19; see alsoJOHN FINNms, AQUiNAS:

CAL, AND LEGAL THEORY

20-51 (1998).

MORAL, PoLu-

1774

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

75:5

